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DEEP SEABED MINING: THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
CHARLES E. BIBLOWIT*
INTRODUCTION
Throughout the years of negotiations concerning the United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, no issue generated
more controversy than the "moratorium question"'-whether
states with the technical capacity to mine the seabed beyond their
jurisdictional limits were free, under international law, to do so
pending the conclusion of a treaty.2 Much of this debate rested on
* Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law; B.A., Tufts Univer-
sity, 1968; J.D., Northeastern University School of Law, 1974; LL.M., Columbia University
School of Law, 1981.
1 See generally 1 T. KnoNmiLLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED AIDNNG 3-7 (1980)
(discussing clash between prior law permitting seabed exploitation and current attempts to
curb appropriation of the seabed); P. RAO, THE PunLic ORDER OF OcEAN REsOURCES: A CRI-
TIQUE OF THE CoNTE poRARY LAW OF THE SEA 88 (1975) (noting passage of the Moratorium
Resolution by U.N. General Assembly after extensive debate). Asserting that the just and
expeditious settlement of disputed ownership rights to deep seabed minerals was essential
to the promotion of the well-being of mankind as a whole, the United Nations General As-
sembly adopted a number of resolutions in the late 1960's and early 1970's concerning, inter
alia, the regulation of deep seabed mining beyond the reach of national jurisdiction. See 1
T. KRONMILLER, supra, at 25-32. One of these resolutions, Resolution 2574D, commonly re-
ferred to as the Moratorium Resolution, specifically provided that:
[P]ending the establishment of the aforementioned international rbgime:
a) States and persons, physical or juridical, are bound to refrain from all
activities of exploitation of the resources of the area of the sea-bed and ocean
floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;
b) No claim to any part of the area or its resources shall be recognized.
G.A. Res. 2574, 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 10, U.N. Doc. A/7630 (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Moratorium Resolution]. The Moratorium Resolution was intended to discourage
the extraction of deep seabed minerals by individual nation-states until an international
resource management system was implemented. See P. RAO, supra, at 88; see also infra
notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
2 See P. RAo, supra note 1, at 76 (reference to dispute regarding exploitation of mineral
resources in international waters); Burton, Freedom of the Seas: International Law Appli-
cable to Deep Seabed Mining Claims, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1135, 1172-80 (1977) (analysis of
conflict between a private corporation's attempts to develop seabed sites and United Na-
tions resolutions prohibiting non-treaty mining); Knight, Issues Before the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, 34 LA. L. REv. 155, 169-76 (1974) (review of
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:267
what has proven to be a false assumption: that either a treaty ac-
ceptable to the United States and to other potential seabed mining
countries would emerge, 3 or the Conference would produce no
treaty at all.4 Contrary to these expectations, a treaty-the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea-was adopted and
signed by the vast majority of nations, yet was rejected by the
United States.5 The United States now seeks instead to assert the
split over whether resources beyond national jurisdiction are "common heritage of man-
kind" and of possible role of an international agency in regulating expropriation of miner-
als); Van Dyke & Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the High Seas". Which Gov-
erns the Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. Rv. 493, 500 & n.24 (1982) (predicting international
confrontation regarding international law principles pertaining to seabed mining). See gen-
erally 0. SCHACHTER, SHARING THE WORLD's REsoURcEs 28-30 (1977) (discussion of prerequi-
sites to any future resolutions intending to effect an equitable distribution of global re-
sources); Arrow, The Proposed Regime for the Unilateral Exploitation of Deep Seabed
Mineral Resources by the United States, 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 337, 350-94 (1980) (discussion
of legality of unilateral exploitation claims); Brown, Freedom of the High Seas Versus the
Common Heritage of Mankind: Fundamental Principles in Conflict, 20 SAN DIEGo L. REv.
521, 541-42 (1983) (discussion of the binding effect of the Moratorium Resolution as to
prohibitions on mining); Post, United Nations Involvement in Ocean Mining, 10 OCEAN
DEv. & INT'L L.J. 275, 281, 289-99 (1982) (exposition on the potential of the United Nations
as an international authority controlling and promoting the business of ocean and deep sea-
bed mining).
' See, e.g., Burke, A Negative View of a Proposal for United Nations Ownership of
Ocean Mineral Resources, NAT. REsouRCEs LAW., June 1968, at 42, 54-56 (inconsistent
objectives of participating states necessitate that an expansive international agreement be
executed to permit more economically developed participants to secure their core value
commercial interests in the sea); Luce, The Development of Ocean Minerals and the Law of
the Sea, NAT. REsOURCEs LAW., July 1968, at 29, 31 (inclusion of major states in interna-
tional agreement necessary for successful regulation of the seabed); Synopsis, 19 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 631, 637 (1982) (western nations regard the Law of the Sea Convention as empty
without United States participation and approval); see also Comment, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Questions of Equity for American Business, 4
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 172, 173 (1982) (treaty provisions dealing with exploration and ex-
ploitations of petroleum resources must be modified before United States will accept
treaty).
" See, e.g., 1 T. KRoNmILER, supra note 1, at 512 (conflict between interests of devel-
oped and developing nations likely to preclude completion of mutually acceptable treaty);
McCloskey & Losch, The U.N. Law of the Sea Conference and the U.S. Congress: Will
Pending U.S. Unilateral Action on Deep Seabed Mining Destroy Hope for a Treaty?, 1
Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 240, 259-61 (1979) (demands of the industrialized nations may render
international agreement on seabed issues impossible); Synopsis-Recent Developments in
the Law of the Sea, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 533, 580-81 (1981) (United States' unilateral
decision to review Law of the Sea Convention terms dissipated optimism among delegates
concerning successful completion of negotiations). But see Nye, Ocean Rule Making from a
World Politics Perspective, 3 0CEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 29, 49-50 (1975) (inability of super-
powers to apply traditional system of military superiority to politics of ocean management
requires them to defer to transgovernmental regimes).
5 Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/
Conf. 62/122, 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LOS Convention]. The Convention
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right of its nationals to mine the seabed independently of the
treaty by negotiating a reciprocating states agreement, or "mini-
treaty," with the handful of other industrialized countries that
have not yet decided whether to sign the United Nations
Convention.'
This unexpected outcome has given new life to the debate. In-
deed, the President of the Law of the Sea Conference has stated
was approved by an overwhelming majority of the industrialized and developing states, and
has been signed by most developing countries as well as a number of industrialized states.
Among the industrialized states that have signed the Convention are Canada, France, and
the Soviet Union. See U.N. CONVENTION ON TH LAW OF THE SEA 1982, xx-xxi (K. Simmonds
ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as LAw OF THE SEA 1982]. The United States, Venezuela, Tur-
key, and Israel voted against adoption of the Convention. See id. at xxi. The United States'
rejection of the treaty stems not from rejection of the concept of an international regime,
but from dissatisfaction with certain provisions of the treaty that arguably do not represent
the relative interests of the developed states. MacRae, Customary International Law and
the United Nations' Law of the Sea Treaty, 13 CAL. W.J. INT'L L. 181, 221 (1983); see also
LAW OF THE SEA 1982, supra, at xvi-xvii (mandatory transfers of technology by member
states, power granted to developing nations in Sea-bed Authority, and the process of
amendment by majority vote perceived by President Reagan as fundamental reasons for
treaty rejection).
6 See, e.g., LAW OF THE SEA 1982, supra note 5, at xi; Cohen, International Cooperation
on Seabed Mining, in LAw OF THE SEA 104-06 (1983); Molitor, The U.S. Deep Seabed Min-
ing Regulations: The Legal Basis for an Alternative Regime, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 599, 608
(1982). France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, have proposed to enter into an agreement by which a reciprocating states' regime
would be created to effectuate the exploration and exploitation of the ocean seabed. LAW OF
THE SEA 1982, supra note 5, at xi; see Agreement Concerning Interim Arrangements Relat-
ing to Polymetallic Nodules of the Deep Sea Bed, 21 I.L.M. 950, 950-62 (1982). The pro-
posed regime would provide a workable formula for seabed mining without the required
technology transfers and international bureaucratic delays that purportedly would accom-
pany a United Nations treaty. See Marshall, Law of the Sea and the New U.S. Oceans
Policy, N.Y. St. B.J., Apr. 1983, at 8, 9-10. Such an agreement would provide for reciprocal
recognition of each signatory's mining sites and also would contain a dispute resolution
mechanism agreed upon by the signatories. Id. at 10. But cf. Oxman, Introduction: On Eval-
uating the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, 19 SAN DIEGO L. Ray. 453, 456-57
(1982) (noting that although a regime representing the confluence of interest of like-minded
industrialized nations may lead to greater accumulation of seabed wealth, other values may
be of more importance than the need to exploit the seabed efficiently).
The negotiations regarding the creation of an alternative mini-treaty by the industrial-
ized nations brought immediate and caustic comment within the United Nations and the
developing world. Burke & Brokaw, Ideology of the Law of the Sea, in LAW OF THE SEA 50-
51 (1983) (Third World states would challenge a mini-treaty before the International Court
of Justice). Some commentators also have been critical. See Molitor, supra, at 611 (referring
to the reciprocal states regime as a fundamental violation of good faith); Ratiner, The Law
of the Sea: A Crossroads for American Foreign Policy, 60 FOREIGN APF. 1006, 1017 (1982)
(execution of an alternative reciprocating states regime will render dubious the lawfulness of
mining claims based on regime and will bring the mini-treaty and the international regime
into conflict).
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that he would ask the General Assembly to seek an advisory opin-
ion from the International Court of Justice if any country were to
attempt to mine the seabed outside the Convention regime.7
Nevertheless, it recently has been suggested that the issue of
the lawfulness of non-treaty mining no longer is important be-
cause such activity will not take place. No mining company, it is
said, would risk the enormous capital required for such a venture
without the certainty provided by a universal treaty. Present eco-
nomic conditions do not favor seabed mining, and even if seabed
mining were to become economically feasible, mining companies
would prefer to mine deposits within the recently expanded na-
tional jurisdiction of the coastal states;9 a reciprocating states
agreement would never reach fruition because there will be no
other states with which to reciprocate. 10 Although I can neither
prove nor disprove the facts underlying these contentions, their
premises are at least questionable. Efforts to predict when seabed
mining will become attractive economically depend on too many
uncertain variables to be relied upon: the future state of the world
economy, the political stability of land-based mineral producing
countries, the prices of various metals, and the development of
7 Ratiner, supra note 6, at 1017; Richardson, The United States Posture Toward the
Law of the Sea Convention: Awkward but Not Irreparable, 20 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 505, 509
n.14 (1983). Ambassador Richardson has indicated that the court probably would hold min-
ing outside the Convention illegal, despite arguments that such mining is a high seas free-
dom. Richardson, supra, at 509. However, nothing in the court's jurisprudence would sug-
gest such a holding. See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
8 For the sake of brevity, mining under the flags of states not parties to the Convention
on the Law of the Sea will be referred to as "non-treaty mining" throughout this Article,
even though it also may occur pursuant to a treaty, separately negotiated by states that did
not ratify the Convention.
0 See Molitor, supra note 6, at 608. Suppliers of venture capital will be hesitant about
investing in an enterprise of such magnitude as a deep seabed mining project with merely
the security of a "single nation's legislative authority." Id. It also is unlikely that bankers
would risk lending the billion-dollar sums necessary for seabed exploration to entities oper-
ating independently of the Convention, since ownership of the discovered resources would
be questionable. Borgese, The Role of the International Seabed Authority in the 1980's, 18
SAN DIEGo L. REv. 395, 400-01 (1981); Brewer, Deep Seabed Mining: Can An Acceptable
Regime Ever be Found?, 12 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 25, 42 (1983); Christy, Alternative
Regimes for Marine Resources Underlying the High Seas, NAT. RESOURCES LAw., June
1968, at 63, 64-66; Marshall, supra note 6, at 13; Richardson, supra note 7, at 508; Nossiter,
N.Y. Times, May 2, 1982.
10 See Ratiner, supra note 6, at 1017; see also Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 550
(members of non-treaty regime would suffer adverse effects as a result of Convention). It
has been suggested that the industrialized nations most likely to mine the seabed, for exam-
ple, Japan, France, and West Germany, will find the Law of the Sea treaty too attractive to
resist and therefore eventually will ratify the treaty. Ratiner, supra note 6, at 1017.
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technology.11 History suggests, however, that when technology
makes a valuable natural resource accessible, exploitation results.
Indeed, the history of classical international law is virtually coex-
tensive with the history of European efforts to exploit the re-
sources of the world that were made available to them by advanc-
ing technology.12 The United States Government must believe that
seabed mining will become important or presumably it would not
have rejected a treaty that is otherwise so beneficial to its eco-
nomic and strategic interests.13
Moreover, happily or not, the decision of the United States
not to sign the Convention is irreversible and a reciprocating states
agreement remains a realistic possibility. The United States Senate
is an institution jealous of its prerogatives. As long as opponents of
the treaty can argue that the Convention raises a possibility of
11 See Branco, The Tax Revenue Potential of Manganese Nodules, 1 OCEAN DEV. &
INT'L L.J. 201, 203-08 (1973); Young, Inducement for Exploration by Companies, 6 SYRA-
CUSE J. INT'L L. & Cori. 199, 201 (1978). But see E. LUARD, THE CONTROL OF THE SEABED
274-80 (1977) (expressing optimism about the predictability of economic variables affecting
the viability of seabed mining). The mere presence of minerals on the ocean floor and the
existence of the applied technology necessary to harvest and process them is not conclusive
evidence that they ultimately will be exploited; a determination of the feasibility of such
mining requires recourse to speculative forecasts of future production costs and market
prices. D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE, SEABED MINING RESOURCES AND THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS
OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 145 (1976). Consequently, although the earliest anticipated com-
mencement of commercial exploitation of seabed minerals will be in the 1990's, both devel-
oped and undeveloped nations are examining the investment atmosphere to measure the
availability of risk venture capital. See id. at 130-31. Unfortunately, it is difficult to perform
any meaningful cost analysis at this stage, since most expenditures are calculated in terms
of exploration costs, and not in terms of the costs of the actual exploitation. Id. at 158. The
problem is compounded by the fact that bxtraction costs will escalate as land-based re-
sources are depleted, since this will increase the number of seabed projects initiated. See R.
ECKERT, THE ENCLOSURE OF OCEAN RESOURCES 7 (1979). As for market prices, the use of past
price patterns to predict future price performance can be misleading, particularly in the
fossil fuel market, because of the possibility of cartel formation. D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE,
supra, at 48.
12 See, e.g., H. SMrrH, THE LAW AND CUSTOM OF THE SEA 4-5 (1950) (European voyages
of exploration spurred development of modern international law); cf. H. BOKOR-SZEGO, THE
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 10 (1978) (effect of technologi-
cal revolution was to alter the nature of international law and to increase the number of
rules comprising it).
13 In announcing his decision not to sign the Convention, President Reagan acknowl-
edged that "[t]hose extensive parts dealing with navigation and overflight and most other
provisions of the Convention are consistent with United States interests." Statement by the
President on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 887 (July
9, 1982); see also McCloskey & Losch, supra note 4, at 241-42 (United States' interests
include freedom of navigation on the high seas and in international straits, protection of
fishing and breeding grounds, and of the ocean habitat).
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amendment without resubmission to the Senate,14 the prospects
for Senate consent will be dim. Under even the best of circum-
stances, obtaining Senate approval of a treaty can be difficult.
Treaties far less controversial than the Law of the Sea Conven-
tion-the Genocide Convention, even the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties-have foundered there.15 In light of the vigor-
ous and influential opposition to the Convention in the United
States,' and the absence of any substantial constituency support-
ing it, even a sympathetic President is unlikely to expend much
political capital garnering Senate consent. Further, the United
States' nonparticipation in the Preparatory Commission's drafting
of regulations may lead to a regime less favorable to American in-
terests than otherwise would have resulted.17 In addition, belated
signature by the United States would mean that crucial positions
1 Under narrowly circumscribed conditions, article 155,4) of the Convention permits
amendment of the seabed mining provisions upon ratification by a three-fourths majority of
the parties. LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 155(4), at 1297-98. The Reagan Administra-
tion regards the Convention amendment procedures as irreconcilable with American proce-
dure for adopting treaties. See LAW OF THE SEA 1982, supra note 5, at xvii; see also Larson,
The Reagan Administration and the Law of the Sea, 11 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 297, 317-
18 (1982) (noting President Reagan's objection to Convention's amendment procedures);
Nossiter, supra note 9, § 4, at 22, col. 4 (provisions permitting treaty amendment without
agreement of all states "seem[s] to fly in the face of the Constitution, which demands Sen-
ate assent to any treaty").
15 Senate consent to and subsequent ratification of a treaty often will be delayed by
domestic political considerations. See G. VON GLAHN, LAW AMONG NATIONS 424 (4th ed.
1981). The failure to ratify the Convention also may be the result of disputes as to the pact's
consistency with American law. See, e.g., id. at 308 (citing Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which has not been ratified by the Senate for
over 30 years, as an example of a treaty whose ratification has been delayed repeatedly as a
result of purported constitutional infirmities). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 130 (1965) (Congress' consent required as
a condition precedent to President's ratification of a treaty).
ie See, e.g., Safire, The Great Ripoff, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1981, at A23, col. 5; Found-
ering Law of the Sea, Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1981, at 22, col. 1 (editorial). Unfavorable senti-
ment to the Convention is not confined to the press. See, e.g., Bandow, UNCLOS III: A
Flawed Treaty, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 475, 477-92 (1982). Some critics maintain that the
treaty is irreparably flawed because of its perceived detrimental effects on the freedom of
American business and the role of the United States as a world leader. See Ratiner, supra
note 6, at 1008. Members of the executive branch and its bureaucracy have been instrumen-
tal in the attack on the treaty. Id.
1 The failure of the United States to participate in the final stages of the treaty bar-
gaining process resulted in the loss of potential concessions in the transfer of technology
provisions and in the amendment provisions, see Richardson, supra note 7, at 507-08 & 508
n.8, and the nation's ideologically rigid stance prevented renegotiation which might have
resulted in a compromise more sensitive to American interests, see Ratiner, supra note 6, at
1013-14.
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in the Secretariat of the International Seabed Authority and on
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, which otherwise
would have been filled by United States nationals, will be filled by
others.18 Thus, the more time that passes, the less likely it is that
the United States will participate.
Nor is it certain that the rest of the industrialized world will
ratify the Convention. Several major industrial states have not yet
signed the treaty, citing reservations about the seabed mining pro-
visions.'" These nations may ultimately conclude that their larger
national interests are served better by participation, or they may
be mollified by the work of the Preparatory Commission. But their
signatures still are far from certain. Such nations are subject to
conflicting domestic political pressures, and progress at the Pre-
paratory Commission has been slow. 0 Even countries that have
signed the treaty may fail to ratify it. The history of United Na-
tions treatymaking is replete with treaties that have been adopted
overwhelmingly, yet have not been widely ratified.2 Nations such
as France, Japan, and the Soviet Union have signed the Conven-
tion, but have kept their options open by adopting interim seabed
18 See Jones, The International Sea-Bed Authority Without U.S. Participation, 12
OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 151, 155-60 (1983). Passage of the Law of the Sea Treaty without
United States participation could have adverse consequences as to the United States' ability
to exert leadership and direction in the international arena in areas other than deep sea
mining. Id. at 156.
19 See LAw OF THE SEA 1982, supra note 5, at xxi. Prospective seabed mining countries
that have not signed the Convention include Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. The United States and the United Kingdom
maintain that certain provisions of part XI, including the mandatory transfer of sensitive
exploration and exploitation technology, are antithetical to their strategic interests. Id. at
xi-xii. See generally E. LUARD, supra note 11, at 176-77 (industrialized nation-states urged
that the proposed international authority limit its control and supervision over deep seabed
mining).
20 See Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
Tenth Session (1981), 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 13-14, 21-22 (1982); Commission Preparing Sea-
Bed Authority Recesses First Session, UN MONTHLY CHRON., June 1983, at 11, 13; Unique
Ceremony Marks End to Long Sea Law Conference, UN MONTHLY CHRON., Feb. 1983, at 3,
6-8. Reconciling domestic perception and international expectations is often a difficult task.
See Nye, Political Lessons of the New Law of the Sea Regime, in LAw OF THE SEA 116-19
(1983). The polarity of opinion within the industrialized states concerning the ratification of
the Law of the Sea Treaty is evidence of political pressure brought to bear on the negotia-
tion process by interest groups.
2 See Gamble, Where Trends the Law of the Sea?, 10 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 61, 76
(1981). Gamble notes that the new treaty might never enter into force at all. Id. at 76-77.
After examining the fate of other treaties and conventions that have been adopted by an
overwhelming margin, he observes that nearly one-half of the signatories of these treaties
failed to ratify them. Id. at 76.
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mining laws that could become permanent.22 In this connection, it
should be noted that the headlong rush to sign has not been fol-
lowed by a similar rush to ratify.23
If a significant number of prospective seabed mining states de-
cide not to ratify the Convention, a "mini-treaty" would become a
viable alternative.24 Though the legal and political risks to a miner
operating under such a regime are no doubt formidable,25 they are
no greater than those faced by investors in many Third World
countries, where mining companies have learned to live with, and
to make allowance for, the threats of political turmoil, nationaliza-
tion, and renegotiation26-risks that are absent from a recipro-
cating states regime. If the price is right, capitalists will take their
chances.
Thus, while mining outside the United Nations Convention is
unlikely if the United States is the only mining country that fails
to ratify, a reciprocating states agreement may well emerge to
make non-treaty mining a reasonable prospect. Seabed mining
surely will occur, sooner or later. When it does, conflict between
parties to the United Nations Convention and non-party miners is
the probable result. The legal framework for dealing with such a
22 See Cohen, supra note 6, at 101; see also Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act,
30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (Supp. V. 1981); Law on the Exploration and Exploitation of Min-
eral Resources of the Deep Seabed, 21 I.L.M. 808 (1982) (France) (reproduction of transla-
tion from the original French text); Edict on Provisional Measures to Regulate Soviet En-
terprises for the Exploration and Exploitation of Mineral Resources, 21 I.L.M. 551 (1982)
(Soviet Union).
22 As of September, 1983, only 9 of the 131 states that signed the Convention had rati-
fied it. See LAW OF THE SEA BULL., Sept. 1, 1983, at 6-10 (table).
24 See Darman, The Law of the Sea: Rethinking U.S. Interests, 56 FOREiGN AFF. 373,
393-95 (1978); supra note 6 and accompanying text.
25 See, e.g., Darman, supra note 24, at 393 (minitreaty would tarnish the image of inter-
national corporations); supra notes 7 & 9 and accompanying text (possible disapproval of
International Court of Justice and reluctance of mining companies to mine pursuant to
minitreaties).
26 Events in Iran after the fall of the Shah in 1979 illustrate in an unusually dramatic
way the risks faced by American businesses in international operations. The immediate con-
sequence of the Iranian revolution and the resulting nationalization was the possible loss of
an incalculable amount of money by American firms. See Eskridge, The Iranian Nationali-
zation Cases: Toward a General Theory of Jurisdiction over Foreign States, 22 HARv. INTL
L.J. 525, 525-26 (1981). The subsequent agreement between the United States and Iran
requiring the United States to terminate all pending and future proceedings in American
courts against Iran and to nullify all judgments and resort to arbitration further compli-
cated the financial consequences of the upheaval. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S.
654, 686-88 (1981) (upholding United States-Iranian arbitration agreement in regard to
claims brought against Iran in American courts).
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conflict is now largely in place.
Beyond the possibility of a legal confrontation between seabed
miners operating outside the Convention and the rest of the inter-
national community, there is another reason for giving attention to
the lawfulness of non-treaty mining. It raises fundamental ques-
tions regarding the nature of the international lawmaking process.
Indeed, non-treaty mining must be held lawful unless the interna-
tional community is prepared to reject one of three norms long
considered inherent in the traditional, consensual view of interna-
tional law: (1) the presumption that states are free to do as they
wish in the absence of a rule limiting that freedom; (2) the rule
that states cannot be bound, without their consent, by a treaty to
which they have not adhered; or (3) the rule that states cannot be
bound by a new rule of customary law over their express and
timely objection. While elaborate arguments have been made that
non-treaty mining would be illegal, all such arguments ultimately
must rest on a rejection of one of these fundamental premises.
THE FREEDOM To MINE THE SEABED
Seabed Mining as a Freedom of the High Seas
The United States and other prospective seabed miners long
have insisted that seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas
under customary law,27 as reflected in the Geneva Convention on
the High Seas.28 Opponents of non-treaty mining have maintained,
27 See 9 Official Records, Third United Nations Conference on the Law of The Sea 104,
106, U.N. Sales No. E.79V.3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS Official Records] (insis-
tence by United States, France, and West Germany that seabed mining is a freedom of the
high seas). At the Conference, Japan's representative stated that his country did not believe
that the measures being undertaken by the other pro-exploitation nations necessarily were
unlawful in the absence of a treaty. Id. at 107. The United States ambassador maintained
that exploration and exploitation of the seabed is a right inherent in the concept of freedom
of the seas. See id. at 106; cf. 2 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 1, at 195-96 (statement of John
B. Breaux, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation and the
Environment, criticizing Third World opposition to the United States' position as a "politi-
cal attempt to secure economic advantages").
28 Convention on the High Seas, done April 29, 1958, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. 2314, T.I.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82-84 [hereinafter cited as Geneva Convention]. Article 2 provides,
in pertinent part:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to subject
any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under
the conditions laid down by these articles and by the other rules of international
law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of Navigation;
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with equal vigor, that it is not.29 The argument is necessarily in-
conclusive. Since, in the past, deep seabed mining has not been
technically feasible, no definitive state practice exists. Seabed min-
ing is not among the activities expressly named in the Geneva Con-
vention as freedoms of the high seas, but the list is, on its face,
open-ended rather than exhaustive. The travaux pr~paratoires of
the Geneva Convention can be cited in support of either position;30
the International Law Commission considered identifying seabed
mining as a freedom of the high seas, but decided not to do so
precisely because such activities seemed too remote a prospect.3 1
One may argue, based on analogies to other activities deemed law-
ful but not enumerated in the Geneva Convention, that the free-
dom of the seas may encompass new uses that previously were not
feasible technologically.3 2 But this argument faces the problem in-
(2) Freedom of Fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.
Id. at 2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. at 83-84.
219 See, e.g., Letter from the Chairman of the Group of 77 to the President of the Con-
ference Aug. 29, 1980, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/106 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1980 Letter],
reprinted in 14 UNCLOS Official Records, supra note 27, at 111, 111-14, U.N. Sales No.
E.82.V.2 (1982); see also 9 UNCLOS Official Records, supra note 27, at 105 (criticism by the
Soviet Union of the United States' position that seabed mining is a freedom of the high
seas); Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 513-14 (position that seabed mining is a freedom
of the high seas based on an improper interpretation of International Law Commission
documents).
30 Compare 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 1, at 349-449 (seabed mining open to all na-
tions) and Burton, supra note 2, at 1170-76 (travaux pr~paratoires support the view that
seabed mining is a freedom of the high seas) with Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 501-
08 (travaux prparatoires are ambiguous and do not demonstrate that seabed mining is a
freedom of the high seas).
31 See Reports of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/3159 (1956), reprinted in [1956] II Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 253, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1956/Add.1. [hereinafter cited as 1956 Report]; Report of the International Law
Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/2934 (1955), reprinted in [1955] 2 Y.B.
INT'L L. COMM'N 21-22, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1955 [hereinafter cited as 1955 Report].
The Commission refused to address the question of deep seabed mining in 1956 because
"such exploitation had not yet assumed sufficient practical importance to justify special reg-
ulation." 1955 Report, supra, at 278.
31 One analogy employed to justify deep seabed mining is that marine scientific re-
search has been deemed a freedom of the high seas, even though it is not specifically listed
in the Geneva Convention as such. See 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 1, at 495-500. Marine
research is analogous to seabed mining in a number of ways. Id. at 495. For instance, re-
search vessels often place equipment into the seabed in the course of their experiments. Id.
Another activity that may be permissible as a freedom of the high seas is the disposal of
wastes, provided such disposal is conducted in a reasonable manner consistent with treaty
obligations. Id. at 504-05. The most common analogies are, however, those specifically men-
tioned in article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas. This provision labels as freedoms
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herent in all such arguments: analogies are, by definition,
distinguishable.3
The Group of 77 also has argued that even if seabed mining
was once a freedom of the seas, it no longer is so because the ma-
jority of states now reject this justification; the opinio juris-the
conviction that a particular usage is a matter of legal right and
obligation-is said now to be lacking. 4 But this argument is no
more than another way of saying that a new rule of customary law
prohibiting non-treaty mining has emerged, a topic to which I shall
turn later.35
The Presumption in Favor of Sovereign Independence
Although no firm conclusion can be drawn as to whether sea-
bed mining is a freedom of the high seas, the ultimate justification
for the position of the United States rests on the more general,
more fundamentally consensual premise that states are free to act
in the absence of a restriction imposed by international law, since
"[r]estrictions upon the independence of States cannot. . . be pre-
sumed." 36 This principle too was affirmed by the western industri-
activities such as fishing and the laying of submarine cables and pipelines. See supra note
28.
" See Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 508-11. One commentator has noted that
such analogies are "either inapposite or incomplete." Burton, supra note 2, at 1153; see also
Goldie, Book Review, A Selection of Books Reflecting Perspectives in the Seabed Mining
Debate: Part I, 15 J. INT'L LAW. 293, 329 (1981) (criticizing overreliance on argument by
analogy to the exclusion of deductive reasoning).
" Letter from the Chairman of the Group of 77 to the President of the Conference
(Apr. 24, 1979), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/77 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 Letter], re-
printed in 11 UNCLOS Official Records, supra note 27, at 82, U.N. Sales No. E.80V.6
(1980). The position that seabed mining is not a freedom of the high seas is reflected in the
Moratorium Resolution, which prohibits seabed mining beyond national jurisdiction pend-
ing enactment of a treaty. Moratorium Resolution, supra note 1, at 11; see infra notes 76-77
and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text.
The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.IJ., ser. A, No. 10 at 18 (Judgment of Sept.
7). The concept of a state's freedom to act in the absence of any restriction is perhaps best
presented in this oft-quoted statement from the S.S. Lotus case:
International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law
binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as expressed in
convention or by usages generally accepted as expressing principles of law and
established in order to regulate the relations between those co-existing indepen-
dent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions
upon the independence of States cannot therefore be presumed.
Id. The presumption has not met with universal approval. See, e.g., Fitzmaurice, The Law
and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54: General Principles and
Sources of Law, [1953] BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 9-18. Fitzmaurice's contention is that while in
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58:267
alized countries during the Law of the Sea Conference, 7 and has
support in the decisions of international tribunals; in determining
whether the conduct of a state is lawful, courts generally ask
whether the action is contrary to a rule of international law, rather
than whether it is affirmatively authorized by a permissive rule.3
At the very least, the presumption in favor of sovereign indepen-
dence is warranted with respect to activities made possible for the
first time by advances in technology. Were it not so, such activities
always would be unlawful because there could be no specific prior
customary rule permitting them. The practice of states has been to
proceed without awaiting the authorization of the international
community. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union
the past states may have been free to act in the absence of any prohibition, in the modern
world such a policy "leads in the final analysis to anarchy, since in the absence of any
clearly proved restricting rule it makes the rights and actions of States dependent in the last
resort on their own will and nothing else." Id. at 10; see also H. LAUTERPACHT, Tm FUNC-
TION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNrry 95-96 (1933) (danger exists that the concep-
tion of states' independence may be used improperly).
" See supra note 27 and accompanying text. In a debate on the proposed implementa-
tion of unilateral deep seabed mining legislation, the French delegate M. De Lacharriere
argued that "no Government could be bound under international law unless it agreed to be
so bound in a treaty." 9 UNCLOS Official Records, supra note 27, at 106. He also contended
that since there were no provisions in existing positive international law that prohibited the
reasonable exploitation of the seabed, France was free to act. Id. The French delegate was
supported by the United States delegate, id. at 104, the West German delegate, id. at 106,
and the representative from Belgium, id. at 107. See generally id. at 103-09 (opinions of
delegates from numerous states on the question of unilateral exploitation of the seabed).
38 See Arrow, The Customary Norm Process and the Deep Seabed, 9 OCAN Dzv. &
INT'L L.J. 1, 3 (1981). In Fisheries, (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 132 (Judgment of Dec.
18), the court stated that the actions of the Norwegian Government in setting its boundaries
were not contrary to any general legal principles or to any express provisions of interna-
tional law. Id. at 143. Judge Alvarez stated, in a separate opinion, that the steps taken were
permissible because they were reasonable, and did not infringe upon rights acquired by
other states, nor did such steps harm any general interests. Id. at 153; see also North Atlan-
tic Coast Fisheries Case (Gr. Brit. v. U.S.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 141, 156 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1910). In North Atlantic, Great Britain asserted a right to regulate the liberties conferred
by a fishing treaty involving British waters, although the treaty did not expressly provide
for such regulation. Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at 157. The Court stated that "the right to
regulate ... is an attribute of sovereignty." Id. Accordingly, if one nation objects to regula-
tions promulgated by another state within that state's territorial limits, the objecting state
would have the burden of proving that the action contravened a rule of international law.
Id. The Court concluded that the United States-the objecting party-did not demonstrate
that a rule of international law controlled the matter, and therefore Great Britain was enti-
tled to take measures necessary for the protection of fisheries and the insurance of proper
public morals in general. Id. at 171.
In these cases, and in the S.S. Lotus, (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A. No. 10, at 18
(Judgment of Sept. 7), the court placed the burden of demonstrating a violation of interna-
tional law on the aggrieved state. See, e.g., id.
DEEP SEABED MINING
sought permission before sending the first satellites into earth or-
bit or before beginning the exploration of outer space. They acted
on the presumption that they were free to do so in the absence of a
rule to the contrary, and international approval followed. 3 The
presumption in favor of sovereign independence is surely the work-
ing presumption of the world's foreign ministries. Indeed, it is a
necessary consequence of the consensual view of the nature of in-
ternational legal obligation. If this presumption is accepted, states
are free to mine the seabed beyond their national jurisdiction un-
less to do so would violate some rule of international law. A deter-
mination of the lawfulness of non-treaty mining, therefore, re-
quires a search for a prohibitory rule.40
LAWMAKING TREATIES AND OBJECTIVE REGIMES
The Effect of the Convention on Non-treaty Mining
One argument advanced for the proposition that non-treaty
mining is unlawful is that the Convention has created legal obliga-
tions binding upon nonparties.41 The language of the treaty has
been read as purporting to bar all states, not merely states parties,
from engaging in seabed mining without proper authorization from
the International Seabed Authority.42 Although this argument de-
fies the conventional wisdom that treaties bind only parties, 43 emi-
nent publicists have stated that some treaties can create "objective
"' The first attempt by the United Nations to regulate the legal status of outer space
was the formation of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space in 1958.
See G. VON GLAHN, supra note 15, at 421. The Soviet Union, however, refused to participate
in this endeavor. Id. Consequently, a treaty concerning the subject of outer space was not
signed until January 27, 1967, long after both the United States and the Soviet Union had
commenced space exploration. Id. at 422.
40 See, e.g., Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.) 1951 LC.J. 116, 152 (Judgment of Dec. 18) (individ-
ual opinion of Judge Alvarez); The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at
18 (Judgment of Sept. 7). But see Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 519-21 (noting that
although the Fisheries and S.S. Lotus cases are good law, the proposition that states may
act freely in the absence of a specific rule arose only because the unique facts of each case
dictated such result).
41 See Ratiner, supra note 6, at 1017, 1020; Richardson, supra note 7, at 509 n.14; Van
Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 535.
42 See infra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
43 See, e.g., G. VON GLAHN, supra note 15, at 17; Parry, The Law of Treaties, in MANUAL
OF PUBLIC INnRNATONAL LAW 175, 219 (M. Sorenson ed. 1968). The Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties codifies a customary principle: "A treaty does not create either obliga-
tions or rights for a third State without its consent." Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 34, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in
8 I.L.M. 679, 693 [hereinafter cited as Vienna Convention]. But see infra notes 59-61.
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regimes"44 or have a "lawmaking" character that creates obliga-
tions erga omnes.45 If such a category of treaty exists, and if this is
what the Convention intends, there would be a strong case for in-
cluding it in the category of treaties that are binding upon nonsig-
natories. The Convention is a constitutive treaty, of a public
character, that establishes an international organization. It was
prepared under the auspices of the United Nations with the partic-
ipation of nearly all the nations of the world. It is "dispositive," in
Judge McNair's sense, because it concerns territorial rights and
creates a special regime for the Area-the seabed beyond national
jurisdiction.46 It is questionable, however, whether the text of the
Convention purports to forbid non-treaty mining, and, even if it
does, contemporary international law has rejected the view that
there exists such a special category of treaties capable of binding
non-party states without their consent.
44 The nature of "objective regimes" has been explained in the following manner.
From time to time it happens that a group of great Powers, or a large number
of States both great and small, assume a power to create by a multipartite treaty
some new international regime or status, which soon acquires a degree of accept-
ance and durability extending beyond the limits of the actual contracting parties,
and giving it an objective existence.
Advisory Opinion of the International Court on the International Status of South-west Af-
rica, 1950 I.C.J. 128, 153 (separate opinion of Sir Arnold McNair).
"' Lord McNair expounded on the asserted authority of treaties with regard to third
parties:
[T]he effect of certain kinds of treaties erga omnes is to be attributed to some
inherent and distinctive juridical element in those treaties-in some cases, the
'dispositive' or 'real' character of the transaction effected by the treaty, and the
permanent nature of the rights created by or in pursuance of the treaty-in
others, the semi-legislative authority of groups of States particularly interested in
the settlement or arrangement made.
A. McNAm, THE LAW OF TREATIES 255 (1961); see also J. BRERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
326-27 (6th ed. 1963) (examples of treaties binding all states, whether signatories or not); H.
KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 484-87 & n.64 (R. Tucker 2d ed. 1966) (treaties
imposing obligations on third states); 1 J. WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 60-61 (1904); Fitz-
maurice, The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice: General Principles
and Substantive Law, [1950] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 8-10. The International Law Commis-
sion, however, declined to include an article in the Vienna Convention that recognized trea-
ties creating objective regimes. See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 34, 8 LL.M. at
693.
46 "Dispositive" or "real" treaties concern in rem rights. A. McNAm, supra note 45, at
256. The most recognizable of the objective treaties are the peacemaking variety, which af-
fect the demarcations of national entities through boundary realignment, through establish-
ment of cessions, or through declarations concerning waterways and the territorial rights of
bordering nations. Id. The territorial rights thus created have a permanence beyond the
existence of the treaty or even the existence of a signatory; in effect, all nations are com-
pelled to honor them. Id. at 256-57.
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The argument that the Convention bans all mining outside the
treaty regime rests on the observation that certain provisions of
the Convention relating to seabed mining refer to "States," while
other provisions refer to "States Parties. 4 7 This distinction is rein-
forced by the treaty's express definition of "States Parties" as
"states which have consented to be bound by this Convention and
for which the Convention is in force."4 s Apparently, when the
drafters intended a provision to apply only to parties, they said so,
and when they intended a provision to apply to nonparties as well
as to parties, they were equally explicit.49 Article 137 provides that
no "state" may exercise rights with respect to minerals recovered
from the seabed except in accordance with the Convention.5
47 Compare LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 137, para. 1, at 1293 ("[n]o State shall
claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of the [seabed] Area or its
resources") and id. art. 142, para. 1, at 1294 (resource salvage activities that overlap limits
of national jurisdiction must "be conducted with due regard to the rights and legitimate
interests of any coastal State") with id. art. 139, para. 1 at 1293 ("States Parties . . . are
[responsible for ensuring] that activities in the [seabed] Area. . . be carried out in conform-
ity with [the Convention]") and id. art. 144, para. 2, at 1294 ("Authority and States Parties
shall co-operate in promoting the transfer of technology and scientific knowledge" to devel-
oping states).
48 Id. art. 1, para. 2(1), at 1271.
41 See supra note 48 and accompanying text. The language of the Convention arguably
distinguishes between those provisions that reiterated customary international law, or that
were intended to have a dispositive effect, and those intended to have contractual ramifica-
tions only. See Lee, The Law of the Sea Convention and Third States, 77 Am. J. INT'L L.
541, 550 (1983) (table). A rule of international law may have a dual effect, functioning both
as a conventional agreement between states parties, and as customary law in regard to third
states. Id. at 553. Such a situation has been acknowledged by the International Law
Commission:
A principle or rule of customary international law may be embodied in a bipartite
or multipartite agreement so as to have, within the stated limits, conventional
force for the states parties to the agreement so long as the agreement is in force;
yet it would continue to be binding as a principle or rule of customary interna-
tional law for other states.
Id. (quoting Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N.
Doc. A/1316 (1950), reprinted in [1950] 11 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 364, 368 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/
SER.A/1950/Add.1. See generally Vierdag, The Law Governing Treaty Relations Between
Parties to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and States Not Party to the
Convention, 76 Abs. J. INT'L L. 779, 786-92 (1982) (discussion of dual regime of treaty law
and customary law). It is arguable, then, that the drafters' use of "States" and "States Par-
ties" was intended to signify those provisions to which all third nations "would be subject
under international law independently of the Convention," and those provisions that serve
as a binding force on the participating "States Parties," respectively. See Vierdag, supra, at
788.
00 Article 137 of the Law of the Sea Convention provides:
1. No State shall claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part
of the Area or its resources, nor shall any State or natural or juridical person
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Therefore, it can be argued that all states, not just state parties,
are bound to conform to the treaty regime.
The text of the Convention can, however, equally bear a
meaning narrower than the prohibition of all non-treaty mining:
nonparties are free to mine the seabed and states parties may be
free to respect nonparties' mine sites, but the parties are bound
contractually not to recognize the nonparties' title to the minerals
after they have been removed from the seabed. This view is sup-
ported by the distinction drawn in the Convention between the
"resources" of the Seabed Area in place and the "minerals" recov-
ered from the Area as a result of mining operations. 1 Under this
construction, the provision that "[n]o state or . . . person shall
claim, acquire or exercise rights with respect to the minerals recov-
ered from the Area ' 52 purports only to deny the validity of the
nonparties' title to minerals after recovery, not their right to en-
gage in mining per se. The next sentence provides: "otherwise, no
such claim, acquisition or exercise of rights [i.e., title to the recov-
ered minerals] shall be recognized."53 This sentence, therefore,
means only that if a non-party mines the seabed, the parties must
not recognize its invalid title to the minerals after their removal
from the seabed. The distinction is an important one. If the Con-
vention is read as merely denying the validity of nonparties' claims
to title to the minerals after recovery, it may disrupt trade in the
minerals between parties and nonparties'-but not trade among
nonparties. It would not exclude non-treaty mining from the cate-
gory of high seas freedoms, or permit direct interference with such
appropriate any part thereof. No such claim or exercise of sovereignty or sovereign
rights nor such appropriation shall be recognized.
2. All rights in the resources of the Area are vested in mankind as a whole, on
whose behalf the Authority shall act. These resources are not subject to alienation.
The minerals recovered from the Area, however, may only be alienated in accor-
dance with this Part and the rules, regulations and procedures of the Authority.
3. No State or natural or juridical person shall claim, acquire or exercise rights
with respect to the minerals recovered from the Area except in accordance with
this Part. Otherwise, no such claim, acquisition or exercise of such rights shall be
recognized.
LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 137, at 1293 (emphasis added).
11 See LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 133, at 1293. "Resources" refers to all miner-
als in situ at or beneath the Area's seabed, while the term "minerals" designates those re-
sources recovered from the Area. Id.
Id. art. 137, para. 3, at 1293.
"Id. The Convention provides: "The minerals recovered from the Area... may only
be alienated in accordance with . . . the rules, regulations, and procedures of the Author-
ity. . . ." Id. art. 137, para. 2, at 1293.
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mining.
Other provisions of the Convention are consistent with this in-
terpretation. Article 139 directs "States Parties" to ensure that the
activities of "States Parties" in the deep seabed are carried out in
conformity with the Convention;54 it does not require that the ac-
tivities of all "states" be carried out in conformity with the Con-
vention. Article 311 prohibits only "States Parties" from entering
into agreements in derogation of the common heritage of mankind
principle.56
Article 153 also may be read as purporting to create an objec-
tive regime. It provides that mining activities in the Area are to be
carried out by the International Seabed Authority itself through its
mining arm (the "Enterprise") or by "States Parties" in associa-
tion with the Authority."' However, if this article is read in con-
junction with the preceding provision that addresses the powers of
the Authority,57 it may be interpreted as a mere limitation on the
Authority itself, permitting it to authorize mining only by the En-
terprise or by states parties in cooperation with the Authority. In
this light, Article 153 has no bearing on the rights of nonparties.
Thus, the text of the Convention does not necessarily even
purport to create an objective regime binding on nonparties. It
may be construed as simply a contractual commitment among the
parties-to mine the seabed only in accordance with the Conven-
tion and to treat as invalid nonparties' claims of title to minerals
after recovery from the seabed."
The Validity of Treaties Binding on Nonsignatories
In any event, whatever the intent of the Convention's drafters,
contemporary international law decisively has rejected the position
that a treaty can bind nonparties without their consent.5 Under
" Id. art. 139, para. 1, at 1293. The treaty holds the states parties liable for any dam-
ages resulting from their failure to ensure that activity in the Area is carried out in accor-
dance with the Convention. Id. art. 139, para. 2, at 293.
65 Id. art. 311, para. 6, at 1327. For a discussion of the principle of the common heritage
of mankind, see infra notes 102-20 and accompanying text.
6 LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 153, para. 2, at 1297.
:7 Id. art. 152, at 1297.
1 See id., art. 133, at 1293. If the Convention is read as merely imposing a duty on
nonrecognition of non-party title to an area's minerals on the states parties, then no effec-
tive interference with activity exclusively between nonparties may he gleaned from the Con-
vention's language.
' See Cahier, Le Probleme des Effets des Trait~s A L'Egard des Ptats Tiers, 143
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the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, a treaty provision
may create an obligation binding a third state in only three cir-
cumstances: (1) when parties to a treaty intend to impose an obli-
gation on a third state and that state accepts the obligation;60 (2)
when a treaty provides for sanctions against non-consenting ag-
gressor states pursuant to the United Nations Charter;" and (3)
when the rule is binding on the third state under the customary
international law, independent of the treaty itself.6 2 The first and
second circumstances are inapplicable here, and the third must be
rejected, since no rule of customary law prohibits seabed mining by
nonparties to the Convention on the Law of the Sea. 3
In drafting the Vienna Convention, the International Law
Commission gave extensive consideration to a proposal that a spe-
cial category of treaties creating objective regimes be recognized."
RECUEIL DES CoURs 589, 644 (1974). International tribunals have declared third nations not
to be bound by multilateral treaties, following the rule pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt
("treaties are neither of benefit nor of detriment to third parties"). See H. KELSEN, supra
note 45, at 484; A. McNAMR, supra note 45, at 309. This principle was firmly established by
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of the Free Zones of Upper Savoy
and the District of Gex, (Fr. v. Switz.), 1932 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46, at 141 (Judgment of
June 7), in which the court noted that "Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles [was] not
binding upon Switzerland, who [was] not a party to that Treaty, except to the extent to
which that country accepted it." Id. But cf. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia, 1971 I.C.J. 16, 58 (Advisory Opinion) (non-member
states obliged to "act in accordance" with Security Council Resolution).
60 The Vienna Convention is largely a codification of the customary law of treaties. See
Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 35, at 693. The Convention provides:
An obligation arises for a third State from a provision of a treaty if the parties to
the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and
the third State expressly accepts that obligation in writing.
Id.
61 Id. art. 75, at 707. Article 75 provides:
The provisions of the present Convention are without prejudice to any obligation
in relation to a treaty which may arise for an aggressor State in consequence of
measures taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations with refer-
ence to that State's aggression.
Id.
62 Id. art. 38, at 694. Article 38 provides that "a rule set forth in a treaty [may become]
binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, recognized as such." Id.
OS See infra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
See Summary Records of the 738th-740th Meetings, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167 (1964),
reprinted in [1964] I Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 96-109 U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1964 [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1964 Summary Records]. The Commission was considering the following draft of
article 63 to the proposed Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provided, in
pertinent part:
1. A treaty establishes an objective regime when it appears from its terms and
from the circumstances of its conclusion that the intention of the parties is to
create in the general interest general obligations and rights relating to a particular
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Among the most outspoken opponents of the objective regime pro-
posal were representatives from Third World countries, who recog-
nized the concept as a relic of the colonial era during which Euro-
pean nations sought to legislate for the world at large.e5 Moreover,
even proponents of the objective regime theory recognized that a
nonparty could not be bound to a treaty rule over its express ob-
jection.6 While the world conceivably might be better if a majority
of mankind could legislate by treaty for all, no such process would
be acceptable to the nations of the world today. Such a process is
simply incompatible with the dearly held principles of sovereignty
and equality of states.67 After thoroughly reviewing the issue, the
Commission rejected the objective regime proposal for lack of sup-
port,6" and concluded that treaties that become binding erga
omnes do so only through the process of customary law forma-
tion.69 Therefore, since the United States is not a signatory to the
region, State, territory, locality, river, waterway, or to a particular area of sea, sea-
bed, or air-space; provided that the parties include among their number any State
having territorial competence with reference to the subject-matter of the treaty, or
that any such State has consented to the provision in question.
Report of the Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/167/Add.1-3, re-
printed in [1964] H Y.B. INT'L L. Coaa'N 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1964/Add.1 [herein-
after cited as 1964 Commission Documents]. Though the text of proposed article 63 would
appear to support an interpretation that would include multilateral treaties that are legisla-
tive in nature, such as the Law of the Sea Convention, an examination of the Commission's
hearings indicates the contrary. Id. at 31. The Special Rapporteur explicitly acknowledged
that proposed article 63 "does not ... include treaties dealing with the high seas or with
outer space, or with particular areas of the high seas or outer space." Id. at 33. The pro-
posed article 63 eventually was deleted from the Vienna Convention. See Summary Records
of the Meetings, [1966] H Y.B. INT'L L. Comi'N 231, U.N. Doc. A/CIV.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1
[hereinafter cited as 1966 Commission Documents].
65 See 1964 Summary Records, supra note 64, at 100-01, 102 (739th mtg.) (Uruguayan
and Indian representatives indicate that objective regimes would result in the vesting in a
certain group of states "a sort of legislative power over the rest of the world"). One com-
mentator has noted: "From the 17th to the 19th century, international order consisted in
the organization of various concerts of Europe designed to ensure that certain power blocs
would gain ascendancy in the interest of their nation-states." T. ELIAs, NE W HoRIzoNs IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 21 (1979).
" See 1964 Summary Records, supra note 64, at 104-05 (remarks of the Special Rap-
porteur); 1964 Commission Documents, supra note 64, at 32 (commentary of the Special
Rapporteur).
e Cahier, supra note 59, at 644.
See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 34, at 693 ("[a] treaty does not create
either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent"); 1966 Commission Docu-
ments, supra note 64, at 231.
69 See 1966 Commission Documents, supra note 64, at 231. The Commission concluded
that parties are never bound to the terms of a treaty to which they have not assented, but
distinguished certain examples of widely accepted principles contained in treaties that are
1984]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
Law of the Sea Convention, the only way it could be barred from
mining the deep seabed is if a rule of customary international law
exists that would prohibit mining outside of the Convention.
CUSTOMARY LAW
The Moratorium Resolution and the Declaration of Principles
In order to determine if there is a rule of customary interna-
tional law prohibiting deep seabed mining outside the convention
regime, some consideration must be given to the legal effect of
United Nations General Assembly resolutions.70 With limited ex-
ceptions, not relevant here, General Assembly resolutions are not
binding on member states. 71 Resolutions are recommendations, not
international legislation. They can, however, and often do contrib-
ute to the formation of new customary rules, for the General As-
sembly is the great forum of the world community. An assessment
of whether the norms stated in any particular resolution have crys-
tallized into customary law requires one to look at the form and
language of the resolution, the size and composition of the vote,
the significance attributed to the resolution by the member states
at the time of its adoption, and the influence of the resolution on
state practice.72 In addition, principles of estoppel and acquies-
cence may be invoked against states voting in favor of a
resolution. 73
not formally adopted by all states, such as the land-war provisions of the Hague Conven-
tion, which have become binding norms of customary law. Id. at 230-31; see Convention
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No.
539.
70 The powers of the General Assembly are limited to those enumerated in the United
Nations Charter. U.N. CHARTER art. 10. These powers include the powers to make recom-
mendations to members and to the Security Council, id. arts. 11, 13, the power to investi-
gate, id. art. 11, and a general administrative and budgetary power, id. art. 17, paras. 1, 3.
71 See, e.g., I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 14, 695-98 (3d ed.
1979).
72 The literature on the lawmaking role of the General Assembly is extensive. See, e.g.,
0. ASAMOAH, THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DECLARATIONS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF
THE UNITED NATIONS 129-60 (1966); H. BOKOR-SZEGO, THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATION 27-32 (1978); J. CASTAf4EDA, LEGAL EFFECTS OF UNITED NATIONS
RESOLUTIONS 203 (1969); R. HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 240-53 (1963); Cheng, United Nations Reso-
lutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law?, 5 IND. J. INT'L L. 23, 31-
40 (1966); Falk, The Quasi-Legislative Competence of the General Assembly, 60 Am. J.
INT'L L. 782, 782-91 (1966); Schachter, The Evolving International Law of Development, 15
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3-7 (1976).
73 Cheng, supra note 72, at 38-39.
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Two resolutions in particular have been relied upon to support
the argument that customary law forbids non-treaty mining: the
Moratorium Resolution of 196974 and the Declaration of Principles
of 1970.75 The Moratorium Resolution called upon states to refrain
from mining the seabed pending agreement on an international re-
gime. 8 Since more than half of the member states of the United
Nations either voted against the Moratorium Resolution or ab-
stained from voting on it, since virtually all of the industrialized
nations of the world dissented, and since even some of its propo-
nents described it as merely hortatory, no binding rule of custom-
ary law can be derived from it."
The Declaration of Principles, however, requires a more dis-
criminating analysis. It has all the formal characteristics of a "law-
making" resolution.7 8 The Declaration was adopted without dis-
74 Moratorium Resolution, supra note 1.
75 G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as Declaration of Principles]. The Declaration of Principles provides, in perti-
nent part:
1. The sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as the resources
of the area are the common heritage of mankind.
2. The area shall not be subject to appropriation by any means by States or
persons, natural or juridical, and no State shall claim or exercise sovereignty...
rights over any part thereof.
Id.
I 7 Moratorium Resolution, supra note 1.
7 Sixty-two General Assembly members voted for adoption of the Moratorium Resolu-
tion, 28 voted against adoption, 28 abstained, and 8 members were absent. See 12 UNrrED
NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 93 (D. Djonovich ed. 1975). Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark,
France, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United King-
dom, and the United States were among the nations voting against adoption. Id.; see also
Arrow, supra note 2, at 375 ("Moratorium Resolution ... cannot be considered evidence of
customary international law"); Brown, supra note 2, at 542 ("Moratorium Resolution
neither created binding rules immediately nor provided a significant basis for the future
development of such rules").
78 Although resolutions adopted by the General Assembly are not legally binding on
members, certain resolutions may become binding on all states through operation of custom-
ary law. See Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 524-25; supra note 72 and accompanying
text. Part of the determination whether a particular resolution has become customary law
revolves around whether the resolution was framed as a "recommendation" or as a "declara-
tion." See Brown, supra note 2, at 540. United Nations practice is that "a 'declaration' is a
formal and solemn instrument, suitable for rare occasions when principles of great and last-
ing importance are being enunciated .... A recommendation is less formal." Id. at 538-39
(quoting Memorandum of the United Nations Office of Legal Affairs on the Use of the
Terms "Declaration and Recommendation," 18 U.N. ESCOR, para. 3, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/
L.610 (1962)). Of course, the size of the majority that supported the resolution, and the
practice of states with regard to the rules laid out in the resolution, will be relevant to the
determination. See Brown, supra note 2, at 539-40.
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sent 9 and the abstainers have become supporters; it may therefore
be treated as unanimously approved for all practical purposes.
Moreover, the United States itself arguably has seen a distinction
between the legal effect of the Moratorium Resolution and that of
the Declaration of Principles. With respect to the former, the
United States consistently has asserted its non-binding nature.
With respect to the latter, the United States has been less consis-
tent, and has sometimes merely asserted that the resolution does
not prohibit non-treaty mining while otherwise taking no position
on its legal significance.80 Assuming for the sake of argument that
states are bound by their universal support for the Declaration of
Principles, it is necessary to turn to the text of the Declaration to
determine to what norms they may have bound themselves.
First, the Declaration of Principles contains no explicit prohi-
bition against seabed mining. That nations which had so recently
voted against the Moratorium Resolution were able to vote for the
Declaration suggests the obvious: that they did not interpret the
Declaration as barring non-treaty mining and that the Declaration
was drafted with purposeful ambiguity so that the members would
not have to retreat from their positions.8 " For example, the pream-
ble to the Declaration refers to the Moratorium Resolution in neu-
tral language, "recalling," not "affirming" it.8 2 The United States
may then maintain fairly 'that, when it accepted the Declaration's
principles, it did not accept an interpretation of the resolution that
79 See Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 522-24. The Declaration of Principles was
adopted by a vote of 108-0, with 14 abstentions. 13 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS, supra
note 77, at 36. The Soviet Union and the Eastern European States abstained. Van Dyke &
Yuen, supra note 2, at 522-23.
SO Mineral Resources of the Deep Seabed: Hearings Before the Subcom. on Minerals,
Materials and Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess. 74-75 (letter from Legal Advisor, Dep't of State); H.R. Rep. No. 411 (H1), 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. 43-44 (1979). However, some Western States were careful to state reservations re-
garding the legal force of the Declaration at the time of its adoption. See 1 T. KRONMILLER,
supra note 1, at 250-52.
81 See Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 525. The language of the Declaration of
Principles is sufficiently vague that it is subject to greatly disparate interpretations. See
supra note 75. The quest for a maximum amount of support for a United Nations resolution
often leads to imprecise enactments. H. NICHOLAS, THn UNITED NATIONS AS A POLITICAL IN-
STITUTION 108 (1959). Such "watering-down" of United Nations resolutions is a common
practice. See id.
82 See Declaration of Principles, supra note 75, preamble; 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note
1, at 253. "Recalling" clearly does not mean "reaffirming." See 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note
1, at 253. Use of the latter term would have rendered unanimity impossible, since it would
have induced the industrialized nations that had opposed the Moratorium Resolution to
vote against the Declaration of Principles. Id.
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would have the effect of imposing a moratorium on non-treaty
mining.8 3 Another preambular paragraph states that the "existing
legal regime of the high seas does not provide substantive rules for
regulating" the exploration and exploitation of the seabed. 4 Al-
though this provision is merely preambular, distinguished jurists
have cited it as authority for the proposition that customary law
does not authorize seabed mining. 5 Western nations, however,
have started from the traditional premises that seabed mining is a
freedom of the high seas 8 and that states are free to do as they
wish in the absence of a prohibitory rule. 7 From this perspective,
no regulatory regime is required to authorize seabed mining. While
a regulatory scheme limiting this freedom may be desirable for
many reasons, until one is agreed upon, freedom of the sea
prevails.
The Declaration of Principles and the Prohibition on Appropria-
tion and Sovereignty
The Declaration states that the seabed shall not be subject to
appropriation and that no one shall exercise sovereignty or sover-
eign rights over any part of it. 8 The prohibition against appropria-
tion and sovereignty no doubt is accepted universally today as cus-
tomary law.89 The Group of 77 maintains that non-treaty mining
would violate this ban. 0 It contends that recovery of the resources
is tantamount to exercising sovereignty, for "[e]xploitation presup-
83 See Statement by the representative of the United States of America in response to
the statement by the Chairman of the Group of 77, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/93 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as 1979 Statement by the U.S. Representative], reprinted in 12 UNCLOS Offi-
cial Records, supra note 27, at 111-12, U.N. Sales No. E. 80.V.12 (1980). The United States
representative issued a statement in response to a letter from the Chairman of the Group of
77 to the President of the Conference. Since the United States supports the Declaration of
Principles, yet insists that it may mine outside of a deep seabed mining regime it never has
assented to, it follows that the United States interprets the resolution as not prohibiting
such non-treaty mining. See 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 1, at 334; Brown, supra note 2, at
558-59.
04 Declaration of Principles, supra note 75, preamble.
8 E.g., 1980 Letter, supra note 29, at 113; see Remarks of Galindo-Pohl to the First
Committee of the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/C.1/PV.1781, at 3 (1970).
' See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
87 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
88 Declaration of Principles, supra note 75, para. 2.
89 See, e.g., 1978 DIG. U.S. PRAc. INT'L L. 1023, 1023-24; 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note
1, at 209, 340-43; S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 116 (1979).
10 See 9 UNCLOS Official Records, supra note 27, at 103-04; 1980 Letter, supra note
29, at 112-13; 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 1, at 319-26.
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poses . . . prior title to the land . . . ."I This argument is not
without some practical force. If a state is free to mine the deep
seabed, it gets all the benefits of ownership regardless of what for-
mal claims are made. 2 Moreover, in light of the evident tendency
of national jurisdictional claims to expand, 3 Third World coun-
tries may well be concerned that mining claims will develop over
time into permanent vested rights.9 4 In other contexts, the grant-
ing of a mineral concession, the issuing of licenses and the enforce-
ment of conservation measures have been considered manifesta-
tions of sovereignty and evidence of title."
Nevertheless, both the text of the Declaration of Principles
and general international law support a different interpretation of
this provision-one espoused by the United States and other
Western industrialized nations: that while the provision prohibits
claims to sovereignty over, or title to, the deep seabed, it has no
bearing on the right to mine the seabed on a non-exclusive basis."
91 Biggs, Deep Seabed Mining and Unilateral Legislation, 8 OcE' DE v. & INT'L L.J.
223, 226 (1980).
912 See id. at 244. The Declaration of Principles provides that no territorial claims to the
seabed can be made by any state. See Declaration of Principles, supra note 75, at 245. It
therefore follows that there can be no mining, because in order to establish rights over a
mining deposit, there also must exist title to the land constituting that deposit. See Biggs,
supra note 91, at 245.
93 See C. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 90 (4th ed. 1959) (detailing
former unwillingness of some states to fix a limit to national jurisdiction). Documentation of
expanding ocean jurisdiction began with the League of Nations codification of the then
ongoing practice of coastal states in extending their claims to include more and more of the
bordering sea. See Report of the Second Committee on Territorial Waters, Publications of
the League of Nations, reprinted in 24 AM. J. INT'L L. 234, 253-57 (Supp. 1930). In 1958, the
first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea approved the extension of coastal
state rights to mineral resources to the limits of the continental shelf. See C. COLOMBOS,
supra, at 68. A major contribution of the third Law of the Sea Conference has been the
concept of an exclusive economic zone that can extend 200 nautical miles from the shoreline
of a nation. Nawaz, On the Advent of the Exclusive Economic Zone: Implications for a New
Law of the Sea, 3 LAW OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 180, 186-88 (R. Anand ed. 1980);
Aguilar, The Patrimonial Sea or Economic Zone Concept, 11 SAN DIEGO L. Rxv. 579, 596-
602 (1974).
4 Cf. Juda, UNCLOS III and the New International Economic Order, 7 0CEAN DEv. &
INT'L L.J. 221, 228-29 (1979) (long periods of seabed mining and "grandfather rights");
Varadhan, Management of Resources of the International Seabed: Recent Trends, in 3 LAW
OF THE SEA: CARACAS AND BEYOND 263, 275 (R. Anand ed. 1980) ("perpetuation of the status
quo ... is against the interest of the developing nations").
" See, e.g., Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Den. v. Nor.), 1933 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B,
No. 53, at 31-32, 52-53 (Judgment of April 5) (mining concessions are evidence of sover-
eignty); Wadlock, Disputed Sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 1948 Barr.
Y.B. INT'L L. 311, 327-29 (1949) (licensing of whaling an indication of sovereignty).
9See 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 1, at 343-44. Japan and key members of the Euro-
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First, the Declaration prohibits appropriation of the "area,"
not of the "resources of the area," and consistently maintains this
distinction. 7 Second, the Declaration draws a distinction between
"exploration,". "use," and "exploitation" on one hand, and "appro-
priation," "ownership," and "claims of sovereignty" on the other;
only the latter are prohibited.98 Although these distinctions may
appear spurious to some, they are rooted firmly in international
law. The argument that exploitation "presupposes prior title" or is
an "exercise of sovereignty" simply does not square with the prac-
tice of states in exploiting the navigational capacity and living re-
sources of the high seas, as well as the radio spectrum and satellite
orbits, without prior title or claims to sovereignty. In addition, lim-
itations on the duration and scope of seabed mining operations
suggest that mining does not constitute an assertion of title or sov-
ereignty.99 Moreover, the United States has never claimed that a
miner could stake out a site and exercise exclusive rights thereon
without the authorization of a universal treaty.100 The United
pean Economic Community supported unilateral seabed mining. Id. at 326. The United
Kingdom, Belgium, and Italy, among others, have stated that the Declaration of Principles
and the Moratorium Resolution do not prohibit deep seabed mining by individual states
because there is no incompatibility between unilateral legislation and the resolutions. Id. at
327. The Netherlands also rejected the argument of the Group of 77. Id. at 328; see also
supra note 27 and accompanying text (American position is that seabed mining is a freedom
of the high seas and unilateral mining is not inconsistent with the Declaration of Princi-
ples). The Soviet bloc, however, now concurs with the view of the developing countries that
seabed exploitation by private and state enterprises is impermissible. Id. at 207.
'7 See Declaration of Principles, supra note 75, paras. 2, 4. The second paragraph of the
Declaration of Principles prohibits any entity from taking exclusive possession of the
"area,"-the seabed, the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof-beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction. See 1 T. KRON LLER, supra note 1, at 266. Since the "resources of the area"
are not mentioned in this paragraph, they cannot be regarded as included in the term
"area." Id. Paragraph 4 provides: "All activities regarding the exploration and exploitation
of the resources of the area. . . shall be governed by the international regime to be estab-
lished." Declaration of Principles, supra note 75, para. 4. The term "shall" in paragraph 4 is
best interpreted in the present imperative. 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 1, at 272.
98 The concepts of "exploration" and "exploitation" are governed by paragraph 4 of the
Declaration, and "use" is mentioned in paragraph 5. See Declaration of Principles, supra
note 75, para. 5. Paragraph 5 reads, in pertinent part: "The area shall be open to use exclu-
sively for peaceful purposes . . . in accordance with the international regime to be estab-
lished." Id. It should be observed that these terms are all discussed in terms of the future
regime. See also S. CASEY, PRECEPT FOR BENTHIC EXPLORATION AND EXPLOITATION 50-52
(1968) (existing rules for exploration and exploitation of mineral resources below the seas).
" See generally Brown, supra note 2, at 527-31 (mining rights limited in area and
time). The distinctions in the Declaration reinforce the argument that seabed mining may
be undertaken only temporarily and that no claim of title to it validly may be made. Id. at
530.
,O See 1974 DIG. U.S. PRAc. INT'L L. 343 [hereinafter cited as 1974 DIGEST]; see also 1
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States' position always has been that mining is a high seas freedom
and therefore entitled to protection against unreasonable interfer-
ence; but that freedom of the seas does not include exclusive rights
to explore and exploit the seabed." 1 The absence of a claim to ex-
clusivity precludes the characterization of non-treaty mining as vi-
olative of the prohibition on appropriation and sovereignty.
The Declaration of Principles and the Common Heritage of
Mankind
The Declaration of Principles also states that the seabed and
the resources of the area are the common heritage of mankind,102
and that "exploration of the area and the exploitation of its re-
sources shall be carried out for the benefit of mankind."' 0 3 Though
few seem to question the proposition that the common heritage of
mankind is a suitable designation for the status of the seabed, the
T. KRONMILLER, supra note 1, at 345-48. Pending the outcome of the Law of the Sea Confer-
ence, the United States would not grant exclusive mining rights to the seabed mineral re-
sources. 1974 DIGEST, supra, at 343; 1 T. KRONMILLER, supra note 1, at 874.
102 See Law of the Sea Negotiations: Hearing Before the Subcom. on Arms Control,
Oceans, International Operations and Environment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Rela-
tions, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1981) (statement of George Taft, Department of State)
[hereinafter cited as Hearing on LOS Negotiations]; Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 539
(United States as well as other nations recognize that no nation has a right to establish
exclusive control over any seabed area).
The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1473 (Supp. V 1981),
formalized the position of the United States and provides authorization for an administra-
tive agency to issue licenses for exploration and exploitation of the seabed. Id. § 1412(a).
This act does not "assert ... sovereign or exclusive rights or jurisdiction over, or the owner-
ship of, any areas or resources in the deep seabed." Id. § 1402(a)(2); see Van Dyke & Yuen,
supra note 2, at 539-40.
102 See Declaration of Principles, supra note 75, para. 1. In a historic address before the
General Assembly of the United Nations, the Maltese ambassador, Arvid Pardo, proposed
that the mineral wealth of the oceans be declared "the Common Heritage of Mankind." See
Mann-Borgese, The Role of the Sea-Bed Authority in the '80s and '90s, in THE MANAGE-
MENT OF HuMANITY's RESOURcES: THE LAW OF THE SEA 35 (R. Dupuy ed. 1982). The "com-
mon heritage" idea has received favor among the developing countries. Oda, The Sharing of
Ocean Resources- Unresolved Issues in the Law of the Sea, in THE MANAGEMENT OF Hu-
MANITY's RESOURCES: THE LAW OF THE SEA 53, 57 (R. Dupuy ed. 1982); see also R. ANAND,
LEGAL REGIME OF THE SEA-BED AND THE DEVELOPING CoUNTrms 207-10 (1975) ("common
heritage" symbolizes the hopes and needs of the developing world). The developed countries
have stressed the limited significance of the Declaration. See supra notes 80-83; see also 1
T. KRONMILLER, supra note 1, at 250-52 (discussing reservations of Australia, Belgium, Ja-
pan, Norway, Portugal, the Republic of China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and
the United States). See generally Biggs, supra note 91, at 237-45 (discussing the common
heritage and the principles that constitute it as customary law).
103 Declaration of Principles, supra note 75, para. 7.
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meaning of this ringing phrase has engendered controversy. 104 The
substantive meanings attributed to it range from a regime of com-
mon international ownership, exercised by a central lawmaking
body, under which no exploitation is permissible without the con-
sent of the international community,105 to a regime of free use,
under which anyone may exploit the seabed on a first-come
basis.l06
Third World spokesmen repeatedly have adopted the former
interpretation, equating the concept of the "common heritage"
with "common property," and have inferred from this that ex-
ploitation requires the consent of the international community. 0 7
Under this view, it is maintained that "heritage" necessarily refers
to a property right passed from one generation to the next. 0 8 But
"heritage" is not a term of art in the common law of property in
1 See R. ANAND, supra note 102, at 205-06; D. LMpzIGER & J. MUDGE, supra note 11,
at 179-80; infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
105 See 1 T. KRONMIXLER, supra note 1, at 280; Pinto, The Developing Countries and
the Exploration of Seabed, COLUM. J. WORLD Bus., Winter 1983, at 30, 32. During the UN-
CLOS negotiations, the Group of 77 sought to implement the common heritage idea by
concentrating all seabed mining activities in the hands of an international organization. See
D. LEPZIGER & J. MUDGE, supra note 11, at 183; E. LuARD, supra note 11, at 169; see also
Eichelberger, A Case for the Administration of Marine Resources Underlying the High
Seas by the United Nations, 1 NAT. REsOURCES LAW. 85, 90 (1968) (United Nations should
create machinery and establish rules under which seabed exploitation will be accomplished).
'0 E.g., Goldwin, Locke and the Law of the Sea, CoUmENTARY, June 1981, at 46, 48; see
also D. LEIPZIGER & J. MUDGE, supra note 11, at 183.
107 See Pinto, supra note 105, at 32. Ambassador Pinto described the common heritage
principle with the following language:
The commonness of the "common heritage" is a commonness of ownership and
benefit. In their original location, the resources of the area belong in undivided
and indivisible share, to all countries-to all mankind, in fact, whether organized
as states or not. "Touch the nodules at the bottom of the sea," they seem to say,
"and you touch my property."
Id.; see also 2 UNCLOS Official Records, supra note 27, at 33 (Tanzania); id at 37 (China);
1980 Letter, supra note 29, at 112 (plea against exploitative licensing). Common heritage
means that an area cannot be subjected to sovereign claims in public law, nor to appropria-
tion in private law, and may imply that all states should participate in the activities in the
area as well as benefits from such activities. See R. ANAaN, supra note 102, at 211-12. The
United States has been unwilling to accept this broad definition of the common heritage
principle. It asserted in the Deep Seabed Hard Minerals Resources Act that it had sup-
ported the General Assembly's Declaration of Principles Resolution and the concept of the
"common heritage of mankind" with the expectation that the principle would be defined
under the terms of the Law of the Sea Treaty. See 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(7) (Supp. V 1981);
Arrow, The "Alternative" Seabed Mining Regime: 1981, 5 FoRDAMi INT'L L.J. 1, 25 n.149
(1981).
108 See Pinto, Toward a Regime Governing International Public Property, in GLOBAL
PLANNING AND REsoURCE MANAGEMENT 202, 208 (A. Doiman ed. 1980); cf. Biggs, Deepsea's
Adventures: Grotius Revisited, 9 INT'L LAW. 271, 280 (1975).
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English speaking countries, and, in ordinary usage, does not refer
to property rights at all. A variant of this argument acknowledges
that "heritage" is "relatively neutral" in English, but contends
that the term as used in other U.N. languages is not. 09 Thus, it is
said that "patrimonio" (Spanish) and "patrimoine" (French) in-
volve "possessory and property rights."11  Even if the term has a
technical legal meaning in other languages, however, not all uses of
the term have such implications. One would not interpret the bro-
mide that "la science est la patrimoine des hommes d' tude"'11 to
mean that these learned gentlemen have a property right. A more
realistic explanation of the choice of the term "heritage" is that it
was intended to imply that present generations have a responsibil-
ity to future generations for the proper use of the resources to
which the term refers. 112
Moreover, even if one accepts the equation of "heritage" with
"property," conclusions about the incidents of this particular form
of common property would be unwarranted. The concept of com-
mon property simply has no settled meaning in international
law."1 ' Although some conception of property may be common to
all legal systems, the specific rights and obligations attaching to
the idea of property are not identical, and no basis exists for con-
cluding that international "common property" implies any particu-
lar configuration of rights except as they have come to be defined
by treaty and custom.114 Therefore, the inference that the consent
109 Saffo, The Common Heritage of Mankind: Has the General Assembly Created a
Law to Govern Seabed Mining?, 53 TuL. L. REv. 492, 514 (1979).
110 Id. "Patrimoine" (French) and "patrimonio" (Spanish), mean "inheritance" as well
as "heritage," and thus imply that property rights are passed to future generations. Id.
"I PTIT LAROUSSE 761 (1961) (knowledge is the heritage of scholars).
2" See Saffo, supra note 109, at 514. Saffo explains that the context in which the term
"common heritage of mankind" is used and the fact that the Declaration of Principles itself
failed to define the term illustrates that the concept is a "nascent legal principle capable of
future elaboration." Id. at 515.
113 The term "common property" has been used to refer to that which belongs to no
one in particular (res nullis), yet belongs to everyone equally (res communis). G. KNIGHT,
THE LAW OF THE SEA: CASES, DocumENTs, AND READINGS 2-18 (1980). However, different and
conflicting meanings often have been ascribed to this term and to the term "res communis."
Id. at 2-20 to 2-22; see Burton, supra note 2, at 1151-64.
114 The proliferation of contradictory and often self-seeking interpretations of common
property has led to the realization that standardized norms defining the principles must be
established. See G. TUNIMN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 133-41 (1974) (discussing inter-
national treaty norms in view of the Vienna Conference). Treaties, for example, constitute
attempts to establish such standardized norms, see id. at 138, since the underlying consen-
sual basis of a treaty gives it the power to create a single rule of law for all participants, see
T. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 40-42 (1974). Consequently, only a mutually satis-
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of the international community is required does not necessarily fol-
low from acceptance of the seabed as common property. Pufendorf
made this point 300 years ago when he distinguished a "positive"
community over things from a "negative" one."' Common prop-
erty in the positive sense cannot be disposed of without the con-
sent of the coproprietors, while common property in the negative
sense is equally available to everyone for exploitation without any
necessity for consent.""6 Further, long before the Seabed Declara-
tion, the expressions "common property," "common patrimony,"
"common heritage," and "common legacy" were applied to the sea-
bed, the oceans, and the living resources of the oceans in contexts
which plainly assumed that exploitation could take place without
the express consent of the international community.11 7 Some sup-
port for the consent requirement may be found in the Gulf of Fon-
seca case, in which the Central American Court of Justice held
that Nicaragua could not grant a concession in the Gulf to the
United States because the Gulf was the common property of the
three riparian states and the consent of all would be required.""' In
that case, however, the issue was whether, upon the dissolution of
the Central American Federation, the Gulf was to remain under
common, undivided sovereignty, or to be divided among the ripari-
ans. The Court did not purport to decide the meaning of "common
property" under general international law. 19
factory global agreement pertaining to this area of the law of the sea could give the term a
definitive meaning under international law. See C. COLOMBOS, supra note 93, at 61-62.
115 2 S. PUFENDORF, DE JuRE NATURAE ET GENTIuM, at 532-36 (C. Oldfather & W.
Oldfather trans. 1964).
116 Id. at 532-38. The origin of all property rights is a "negative" community in things.
Id. at 537. Such chattels belonged to no one, so any person was free to appropriate what he
needed for his own purposes without securing the permission of others. Id. The right to
transform this negative property right into positive ownership existed equally for everyone.
Id. Once an item became joint property, it could not validly be divested without the permis-
sion of all. Id.
117 J. KISH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 55 (1973) (high seas are the "common
property" of all nations); M. McDouGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
563 (1962) (oceans "long regarded as the 'common patrimony' of all mankind"); see also
Report of the Exploitation of the Products of the Sea [1925-1928], 2 LEAGUE OF NATIONS
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS FOR THE PROGRESSrE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 146, 149
(S. Rosenne ed. 1972) (annex to Questionnaire No. 7). The wealth in the ocean is "the patri-
mony of the whole human race .... [It is] the uncontrolled property of all, [and] belongs
to nobody .... ." Id.; Recommendation Concerning the Protection of Fisheries, [1930] 3
LEAGUE OF NATIONS CONFERENCE FOR THE CODIFICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 871 (S.
Rosenne ed. 1975).
118 Gulf of Fonseca (El Sal. v. Nicar.), 11 A M. J. INT'L L. 674, 728-29 (1917).
119 See id. at 709-14 (discussing the nature of "possession in common"). The Central
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This is not to suggest that the common heritage principle
places no restrictions on the conduct of states operating under a
reciprocating states regime. Though a free access regime might
provide some benefits for "mankind as a whole," it would hardly
give "particular consideration [to] the interests and needs of devel-
oping countries."1 20 This requirement, however, could be satisfied
by appropriate provisions in a reciprocating states agreement.
Construction of the Declaration of Principles
The strongest argument for reading a prohibition on mining
outside the U.N. Convention into the Declaration of Principles de-
rives from reading together the 3d, 4th, 9th, and 14th paragraphs
of the Declaration. These paragraphs declare that an international
regime is to be established via an "international treaty of a univer-
sal character, generally agreed upon," '121 to govern the exploration
and exploitation of the resources of the seabed. 122 They further de-
clare that no state or person shall exercise rights to the seabed or
its resources that are incompatible with this regime.123 Accord-
ingly, it has been argued that the Convention is the treaty through
which a new regime has been created for the seabed. The Conven-
tion is "universal" because it purports. to apply to all states and
not merely to states parties. 24 It is "generally agreed upon" be-
American Court of Justice traced the history of the Gulf of Fonseca from 1522, when Spain
discovered the gulf "and incorporated [it] into the royal patrimony of the Crown of Castile
.. " Id. at 700. El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, as successors to the Spanish inter-
est in the land surrounding the gulf, thus acquired joint property interests in the gulf itself,
id., interests the legitimacy of which was confirmed by a consensus of the community of
nations, id. at 701. The court thus held that Nicaragua could not grant a concession in the
gulf to the United States under the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, since such a concession would
violate the joint ownership rights of El Salvador. Id. at 730.
However, Gulf of Fonseca does not provide support for the theory that "common heri-
tage" is synonymous with "common property," or that "common property" has any particu-
lar meaning in general international law, because the result turned on the circumstances of
the case. The Gulf of Fonseca is almost completely enclosed by the coastlines of El Salva-
dor, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Id. at 701-04. This, coupled with recognition through history
of these nations' joint ownership rights, led the court to conclude that the gulf was an "his-
toric bay" and a "closed sea" conferring special rights on the nations whose coasts enclosed
the gulf. See id. at 707.
120 Declaration of Principles, supra note 75, paras. 7, 9.
1 Id. para. 9.
12 Id. pares. 4, 14.
121 Id. para. 3.
124 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
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cause the great majority of nations of the world have signed it. 12 5
Thus, pursuant to the Declaration, all states have agreed that no
seabed mining activities will take place which are not in conform-
ity with the Convention regime. 126
Although this argument can be said to be consistent with the
language of the Declaration, finding such consistency requires a
construction of the Declaration that is not credible. None of the
interested states would have supported the Declaration if they had
understood such support to mean that they were binding them-
selves in advance to the unknown terms of a treaty to be negoti-
ated in the future. Moreover, such a construction would be anoma-
lous in light of the law of treaties. A state that has signed a treaty
is obliged to refrain from acts which would frustrate the treaty's
purpose only until it has made clear its intention not to become a
party;127 it is not legally bound to ratify the treaty.128 Thus, once it
has made clear its rejection of the treaty, it is free from legal re-
straints under it. A fortiori, a state that merely has voted for a
General Assembly resolution cannot be bound legally to comply
with a treaty the terms of which are not yet known. If a state may
free itself from obligations under a treaty that it has negotiated
and signed, it surely must be free to reject a treaty it has never
signed and never seen. 129
A more plausible interpretation of these Declaration provi-
sions is that they represent no more than a commitment to at-
tempt to negotiate a treaty. A treaty of "universal character, gener-
ally agreed upon" may mean a treaty adopted by consensus.130
125 As of September 1983, 131 states had signed the Convention on the Law of the Sea.
LAW OF THE SEA BULL., Sept. 1, 1983, at 6-10 (table).
128 Declaration of Principles, supra note 75, para. 9; see, e.g., 1980 Letter, supra note
29, at 112.
'17 See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 18(a), 8 LL.M. at 686.
128 See Hassan, Good Faith in Treaty Formation, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 443, 459-64 (1981)
(discussion of discretionary ratification). Although a state has no legal obligation to ratify a
treaty that it has signed, it arguably may have an affirmative moral obligation to do so. Id.
at 459; see also Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 657-65
(Supp. 1935) (pt. 3) (state has moral obligation to fulfill a treaty it has signed); Harley, The
Obligation to Ratify Treaties, 13 Am. J. INT'L L. 389, 405 (1919) (obligation increases with
scope and difficulty of negotiation).
129 See Arangio-Ruiz, The Normative Role of the General Assembly of the United Na-
tions and the Declaration of Principles of Friendly Relations, 137 RECUEIL DES CouRs 419,
449 (1972). Parties to a declaration are not legally bound as they would be to a ratified
treaty; they only are bound by their adherence to it through custom. Id.
130 See Oxman, supra note 20, at 9 (quoting Professor Riphagen, Netherlands). The
Rules of Procedure adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
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Such a treaty would be "universal" in that no state rejects it; and
it would be only "generally agreed upon" because many states may
dislike specific provisions, but be willing to accept the treaty as a
whole. Under this interpretation, no such treaty has been adopted
because the treaty was approved by vote, not by consensus.
Thus, even if the Declaration of Principles can be said to have
binding force, nothing on its face compels the conclusion that sea-
bed mining is prohibited outside the Law of the Sea Convention.
Each of the relevant provisions of the Declaration is subject to
more than one plausible interpretation. Of course, if a consensus
has developed as to any particular interpretation during the course
of the ensuing years of negotiation, that interpretation would be a
customary norm.131 However, the prospective seabed mining states,
which would be specially affected by such a rule,132 repeatedly have
rejected any interpretation of the Declaration which would bar
non-treaty mining.13 3 Indeed, they have asserted throughout the
course of negotiations that mining is lawful, and may proceed as a
freedom of the high seas.3 Though the position of these states
may be a minority one,3 " the principle of majority rule does not
govern in international law. 3 6 Something more-be it consent, ac-
sought to achieve agreement on all substantive matters by consensus. No voting was author-
ized until all efforts at consensus had been exhausted. See Rules of Procedure of the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/30/Rev.1 Rules
37, 39.
"I See Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 18, 38
(Judgment of Feb. 24).
1"2 See North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den., W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 3,
43 (Judgment of Feb. 20) (formation of new rule of customary international law requires
acceptance of the practice by "states whose interests are specially affected"); Lauterpacht,
Sovereignty Over Submarine Areas, [1950] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 376, 394 (any new interna-
tional norms relating to sea will have particular effect on a few large nations, such as the
United States and Great Britain). Hence, the significance of such a change lies not simply in
the number of states participating in its promulgation, but also in the identity of the states
involved. Id.; see also Waldock, The Legal Basis of Claims to the Continental Shelf, 36
GROTIUS SOC'Y 115, 137 (1950).
" See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
135 See Van Dyke & Yuen, supra note 2, at 497-98. Of all the states taking part in the
United Nations Law of the Sea Conferences, about 12 or 15 countries consider seabed ex-
ploitation a high seas freedom, while 130 countries oppose that view. Id.; Hearing on LOS
Negotiations, supra note 101, at 30 (statement of Ambassador Richardson) (United States
position on seabed exploitation a minority view).
" See J. BRixY, OUTLOOK FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 99 (1945). The creation of a new
rule of international law does not depend on a plurality. Id. To achieve binding force, con-
sensual agreement must be reached by all parties involved; however, the new rule will not
bind those who have objected. Id.; see Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International
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quiescence, or consensus-is required to create a new rule of cus-
tomary law. The statements and actions of the seabed mining
states demonstrate that they have not consented to or acquiesced
in a prohibitory rule; no consensus has emerged and no such rule
has crystallized. Furthermore, even if a prohibitory rule could be
said to have come into existence by virtue of support for it among
the overwhelming majority of states, the traditional view holds
that it could not be opposed to those states that have rejected it
clearly and persistently during the process of its formation.13 7
The conclusion of a treaty embodying a particular construc-
tion of the Declaration of Principles does not change this result.
From the standpoint of nonsignatories, the Law of the Sea Con-
vention is res inter alios acta.138 A subsequently concluded recip-
Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92 RECUEIL DES COURS 1, 101-05
(1957). Put another way, for the custom to become binding law, a general usage or practice
must exist and must be regarded as binding by the participants. Fitzmaurice, supra, at 101.
This requirement amounts to consent. Id. at 102. See generally G. TuNKIN, supra note 114,
at 123-33 (consensual framework a prerequisite to transform custom into law); D'Amato, On
Consensus, [1970] CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 104, 104-05 (international law defined as that common
perception among states as to what law should be); MacGibbon, Customary International
Law and Acquiescence, [1957] BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 115, 131-38 (customary rights and duties
endowed with binding force via consent).
'37 See, e.g., Fisheries Case (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Judgment of Dec. 18)
(Norway not bound by 10-mile rule because of consistent and unequivocal refusal to accept
it); Asylum (Colum. v. Peru), 1950 LC.J. 266, 277-78 (Judgment of Nov. 20) (Peru not
bound by custom among Latin American countries since it had repudiated that custom); see
also L BROwNmE, supra note 71, at 10-11 (states unaffected by rule rejected by them at its
conception); G. TUNKIN, supra note 114, at 130 (state objecting to formation of new rule not
bound because of lack of consensual agreement). See generally Fitzmaurice, supra note 36,
at 24-26 (no rule of international law has bound a state that rejected it at rule's formation);
Fitzmaurice, supra note 136, at 99-101 (disassociation from rule at its conception will pre-
vent state from becoming bound); Fitzmaurice, supra note 45, at 49-50 (outright rejection of
rule at formation prevents binding application to rejecting state).
"8 The law of evidence defines the term res inter alios acta as acts and statements of
or in relation to strangers, and declares them irrelevant. See, e.g., Chicago & E.I.R.R. v.
Schmitz, 211 Ill. 446, 456, 71 N.E. 1050, 1054 (1904). As applied to treatymaking, the rule
embodies a consensual requirement; that is, "as regards States which are not parties ... a
treaty is res inter alios acta." A. McNAm, supra note 45, at 309. According to Lord McNair,
it is a well-established principle that a treaty imposes no obligations upon nonparties. See
id. at 310; supra note 45 and accompanying text. An example of the workings of this provi-
sion may be found in the Swiss case of Trampler v. High Court of Zurich, discussed in 1925-
1926 ANNUAL DIGEST OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES 351 (1929). In that case, Tram-
pler, a German national, owed a debt to two French nationals, and was sued in the High
Court of Zurich, the city in which he was then living. Id. He. objected to the court's exercise
of jurisdiction over his person, claiming that under the Treaty of Versailles, an exclusive
proceeding had been established for claims of war debts. Id. The court denied this objection
on the ground that Switzerland was not a party to the Versailles Treaty, and therefore, the
treaty had no effect on the jurisdiction of a Swiss court. Id.
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rocating states agreement among four or five states has no less le-
gal significance in international law than a previously concluded
treaty among 120 states." 9
The Common Heritage of Mankind as a Peremptory Norm
Perhaps in implicit recognition of these stumbling blocks,
Third World opponents of non-treaty mining have characterized
the common heritage of mankind principle as a peremptory norm
of international law.140 A peremptory norm is one that is "accepted
. . . by the international community of States as a whole," '' as
being so fundamental that no derogation is permitted. 42 A treaty
violating such a norm is void. 43 It has been asserted that the corn-
139 See D'Amato, An Alternative to the Law of the Sea Convention, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
281, 283 (1983); see also G. SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 (5th
ed. 1967) (number of signatories to a treaty does not increase its effect on the legal relations
of nonparties absent their consent, since a treaty is more like a contract than a statute); cf.
I. BROWNLIE, supra note 71, at 619-20 (general rule is that treaty creates neither obligations
nor rights in nonparties if it does not represent customary law or a peremptory norm).
140 See, e.g., 1980 Letter, supra note 29, at 3 (principles of the common heritage of
mankind is a customary rule that has the force of a peremptory norm); 2 UNCLOS Official
Records (17th plenary mtg.): supra note 27, at 87, U.N. Sales No. E.75.V.4 (1974) (Indian
ambassador stated that common heritage principle represented not just a conventional but
also a peremptory norm of international law); 14 UNCLOS Official Records (136th mtg.),
supra note 27, at 37, U.N. Sales No. E.82.V.2 (1980) (Argentinian ambassador expressed
regret that two states violated what his nation, and vast majority of countries, viewed as jus
cogens by enacting unilateral mining provisions).
M Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 53, 8 I.L.M. at 698-99.
14, Peremptory norms are referred to as jus cogens. See Report of the International
Law Commission to the General Assembly, 18 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) at 697, U.N. Doc.
5509, reprinted in [1963] 2 Y.B. INr'L L. COMM'N 187, 198. Norms of jus cogens represent
overriding principles that cannot be avoided by individual agreements. See
Schwarzenberger, International Jus Cogens?, 43 TEX. L. Rv. 455, 456 (1965). Rules of jus
cogens "are rules of customary law which cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but
only by the formation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect." I. BROWNLIE,
supra note 71, at 513. Therefore, a treaty that contradicts a peremptory norm of interna-
tional law cannot stand. See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 53, 8 I.L.M. at 689. See
generally T. ELIAS, supra note 65, at 49-51 (detailing compromise reached by Third World,
Eastern European, and Western States to include a jus cogens provision at Vienna
Convention).
M" See I. BRowNLm, supra note 71, at 513. Certain activities have been deemed so re-
pugnant that prohibitions against committing them often are cited as examples of peremp-
tory norms of international law. For example, a treaty purporting to recognize genocide
would be in derogation of a fundamental, peremptory norm, and therefore would be void.
Id.
In considering the 1966 draft articles on the law of treaties, some members of the
United Nations International Law Commission believed that illustrations of "some of the
most obvious and best settled rules of jus cogens" would be helpful. See Report of the
International Law Commission to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/6309/Rev.1, reprinted
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mon heritage is a peremptory norm by virtue of its acceptance as
such by the overwhelming majority of states at the Conference on
the Law of the Sea, on behalf of the "international community of
states as a whole. ' 144 This view is reinforced by the Convention's
prohibition of reservations, its restrictions on amendments with re-
spect to the seabed mining provisions, and its prohibition on states
parties entering into agreements in derogation of the common heri-
tage principle.145 According to this view, a reciprocating states
agreement is void because it violates the peremptory norm.
The difficulties with this argument are several. First, a recipro-
cating states agreement need not be inconsistent with the common
heritage principle, properly construed. 146 Second, a specific propo-
sal to include in the Convention a provision declaring the common
heritage principle a peremptory norm met with substantial opposi-
tion and was rejected in favor of narrower language precluding
only states parties from entering into agreements in derogation of
in [1966] 2 Y.B. INT'L L. Cohi'N 169, 248, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966 [hereinafter cited
as 1966 International Law Commission Report]. In addition to prohibitions against genocide
and the use of force in international relations, the examples included: (1) a treaty to commit
a crime under international law; (2) a treaty advocating trade in slaves; (3) a treaty in viola-
tion of human rights; and (4) a treaty in violation of the principle of self-determination. Id.
The Commission decided not to include any examples in the draft articles, however, to
avoid limiting the scope of jus cogens. Id.
144 See Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 53, 8 LL.M. at 699. Article 53 of The
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines a peremptory norm of general interna-
tional law as one "accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole." Id. (emphasis added). The words "as a whole" were added by the committee that
drafted the article to ensure that no one nation by itself could prevent the recognition of a
rule of international law as a jus cogens norm. C. RozAss, THE CONCEPT OF Jus COGENS IN
THE LAW OF TREATIES 77 (1976); L SzTUCKI, Jus Cogens AND THE VmNNA CoNvSNTION ON THE
LAW OF TREATIES 98-100 (1974). This terminology necessitates an inquiry into how many
nations must object to prevent the emergence of a peremptory norm. See, e.g., L SZTuciK,
supra, at 99-100. One commentator has suggested that a numerical consideration should not
be dispositive, but rather, that "the existence of contrary practice by a number of States
weakens the evidential position of that [proposed jus cogens] norm." C. RoZms, supra, at
79. Advocates of the position that the common heritage doctrine is a peremptory norm,
however, cite for support the vast majority by which the Declaration of Principles was ac-
cepted. See 1980 Letter, supra note 29, at 112; supra note 79 and accompanying text.
115 See LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 309, at 1327 (no reservations or exceptions
allowed unless specifically permitted); id. art. 311(6), at 1327 (states parties agree not to
enter any agreement, nor make any amendment, in derogation of the "common heritage"
principle); see also id. art. 155, at 1297-98; id. arts. 312(1), 313(1), 314, at 1327-28.
146 One commentator has suggested that an alternative treaty might best be drafted to
withstand future legal challenge before an international tribunal by adopting realistic provi-
sions for sharing the resources of the "common heritage." See D'Amato, supra note 139, at
284-85.
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the Convention. 14 7 Indeed, the view that nonderogation provisions
in a treaty demonstrate the existence of peremptory norms was re-
jected by the International Law Commission in drafting the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 148 Moreover, the fact that
a norm is accepted as customary law by the "international commu-
nity of states as a whole" does not make it peremptory; rather, its
peremptory nature must be recognized by the "international com-
munity of states as a whole."14 Even if the Convention is ulti-
mately ratified by enough states to be described as the "interna-
tional community ... as a whole," no inference properly could be
drawn that all signatories consider the common heritage principle
a customary norm, rather than merely a treaty norm, let alone that
they consider it peremptory.
247 The Chilean delegation proposed the following language in an effort to declare the
"common heritage" principle a peremptory norm of international law:
The States Parties to the present Convention accept and recognize on behalf of
the international community as a whole that the provision relating to the common
heritage of mankind set out in article 136 is a peremptory norm of general inter-
national law from which no derogation is permitted and which, consequently, can
be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the
same character.
Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: the Eighth Session
(1979), 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 39 n.144 (1980). The proposal was an attempt to foresee incon-
sistencies between the provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention and any subsequent
agreements. See id. at 39. Resistance to the proposal, however, led to modification in the
language. See Goldie, supra note 33, at 319; Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea: The Ninth Session (1980), 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 211, 250 (198"1). The
language ultimately adopted is in Article 311 of the Convention:
States Parties agree that there shall be no amendments to the basic principle
relating to the common heritage of mankind set forth in article 136 and that they
shall not be a party to any agreement in derogation thereof.
LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 311(6), at 1327.
148 The International Law Commission suggested that a rule of international law does
not assume the character of jus cogens simply because the treaty asserts that this is the
case. See 1966 International Law Commission Report, supra note 1,13, at 248. Though par-
ties may include a provision forbidding derogation from a specific provision of the treaty,
that provision does not become a peremptory norm unless "the particular nature of the
subject-matter with which it deals ... give[s] it the character of jus cogens." Id.; see also I.
SzTucKi, supra note 144, at 180 (convention failed to delineate treaty categories to which
jus cogens would apply).
149 To satisfy the provision of article 53 of the Vienna Convention, the rule of interna-
tional law first must be shown to be a "customary or conventional rule." C. ROZAKIS, supra
note 144, at 73-74. Beyond this preliminary test, however, the norm's peremptory quality
must be both "accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole." Vienna Convention, supra note 43, art. 53, 8 I.L.M. at 698-99. That is, "[i]t must be
proved ... that the rule enjoys the consent of the international community as to its specific
character, namely its capacity to invalidate agreements contrary to its content, thereby lim-
iting the autonomy of State will." C. RoZAKIS, supra note 144, at 74.
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But surely, the argument must be wrong at a more fundamen-
tal level. I have already shown that customary law does not pro-
hibit seabed mining under a reciprocating states regime. If no such
customary norm exists, a fortiori no such peremptory norm exists,
for it makes no sense to establish a lower threshold for the creation
of a peremptory norm than for any other norm.
CONCLUSION
Under this analysis, the International Court of Justice, faced
with a request for an advisory opinion, would have to conclude
that seabed mining under a properly drafted reciprocating states
agreement is lawful despite the Law of the Sea Convention. To do
otherwise would entail the rejection of one of three norms long rec-
ognized as reflecting the consensual nature of international law:
the presumption that states are free to act in the absence of a re-
straining rule of law; the rule that states cannot be bound by a
treaty without their express consent; or the rule that states cannot
be bound by a newly created customary norm over their express
and timely opposition.
Although eminent authorities have asserted that the World
Court would hold non-treaty mining illegal, 1 0 nothing in the
court's jurisprudence suggests such temerity. Indeed, the court,
when recently presented with an opportunity to introduce a bold
principle of substantive redistribution into its case law, declined
the invitation.15a Yet such a ruling would have been a less radical
departure from prior understandings than would be a ruling that
rejects one of the three norms previously mentioned and thus jeop-
,11 See Richardson, supra note 7, at 509. Ambassador Richardson, former Chairman of
the United States Delegation to the Conference under President Carter, contends that the
International Court of Justice is likely to declare non-treaty mining illegal. See id.; see also
R. ANAND, supra note 102, at 267-68 (since the Declaration of Principles, "there is no longer
a legal vacuum" regarding the seabed, and actions by developed countries in violation
thereof properly are criticized); cf. Ratiner, supra note 6, at 1017 (extended confrontation
before the General Assembly and the International Court of Justice challenging an alterna-
tive treaty would have a chilling effect on seabed mineral investment).
161 See Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), 1982 LC.J. 18 (Judgment
of Feb. 24). In that case, Tunisia argued that an equitable delimitation of the continental
shelf should work in its favor since, by comparison to oil-rich Libya, Tunisia is resource
poor. Id. at 77. The court firmly rejected this proposition, observing that "these economic
considerations cannot be taken into account for the delimitation of the continental shelf
areas appertaining to each Party." Id. The court found these considerations too variable to
provide a basis for decision. Id.
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ardizes the consensual framework of the law of nations.152 Nor do I
think that many states would want the court to reject rules intrin-
sic to the consensual view, however much they may wish to have
non-treaty mining held illegal. Certainly the Eastern European
states are attached at least as strongly to the consensual view as
are the states of the West. Even the Third World nations, despite
their collective majority, might be circumspect about such inroads
on their own individual sovereignty.
Does all this mean that we would be faced with an irresolvable
stalemate-two lawful treaty regimes, under which the members of
each are free to stake conflicting claims and poach on the other's
mining sites? The rule that the freedom of the high seas must be
exercised with reasonable regard to the interests of other states in
their exercise of such freedom-accepted under both re-
gimes 1 35-might preclude direct disruption of mining activities, but
probably would not prevent conflicting claims. No relevant sub-
stantive rule of boundary delimitation exists.
Is this then the infamous "lacuna" in the law? Would an in-
ternational tribunal have to throw up its hands in defeat? The an-
swer is "no"-or, at least, "not quite." International law does pro-
vide an answer, if not an entirely satisfactory one. It requires the
parties to undertake to negotiate in good faith for an equitable so-
lution of conflicting claims. Although this proposition has been
questioned,154 international tribunals have held repeatedly that
conflicting claims to natural resources give rise to an obligation to
negotiate.1 55 This rule is reflected also in the many bilateral agree-
182 Economic factors have been deemed relevant to the resolution of maritime boundary
disputes. See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 29 (Judgment of July
25); Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 133 (Judgment of Dec. 18).
153 See Geneva Convention, supra note 28, art. 2, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,
450 U.N.T.S. at 82-84. The Convention on the High Seas provides that the freedom of the
high seas must be exercised "with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their
exercise of" the same right. Id. The freedom of the high seas principle is recognized under
the Law of the Sea Convention as well. See LOS Convention, supra note 5, art. 87(1), at
1286-87. Moreover, the requirement that the exercise of high seas freedom must be con-
ducted with due regard for others' rights to exercise the same freedom also has received
express recognition. Id. art. 87(2), at 1287. Therefore, both treaty regimes would recognize,
at least in principle, a duty on the part of states to allow other states to exercise their rights.
14 R. FisHER, IMPROVING COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 n.5 (1981).
155 See, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3, 34 (Judgment of July 25)
(disputing nations held to be under mutual obligations to negotiate respective fishing rights
in good faith); North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Den.; Fed. Rep. Ger. v.
Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 4, 47 (Judgment of Feb. 20) (parties obligated to negotiate a delimitation
dispute meaningfully); Lake Lanoux Arbitration (Fr. v. Spain), 1957 I.L.R. 101, 119 (Arbi-
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ments between neighboring states that prescribe negotiations in
the event of disputes concerning marine resources."' 6 It is rein-
forced by the United Nations Charter, which requires states to re-
solve their disputes by peaceful means. 57 Pursuant to this rule, the
parties to a seabed mining dispute are obliged "to conduct them-
selves [so] that negotiations are meaningful," and to "make every
possible effort" to achieve agreement.15 s
Such an obligation to negotiate may seem to be a futile and
ineffectual solution. Why, after all, should negotiations under-
taken, say, a decade hence succeed where a decade of negotiations
behind us has failed? I believe there is reason to be hopeful that an
accommodation could be reached. The prospects for agreement
may be better when seabed mining is an imminent reality rather
than a speculative possibility. All participants will be acting on the
basis of more complete information. We shall know what the costs
of seabed mining are, and what the rate of return will be. We shall
know if the International Seabed Authority can operate fairly and
efficiently. We shall know if the United States needs a universal
accord in order to enjoy the benefits of unimpeded navigation. We
shall know if the rest of the world needs the capital and technology
the United States can provide in order for seabed mining to pro-
ceed. Perhaps then, and only then, when the stakes are known, will
all participants be willing to put aside the ideological posturing
that has precluded agreement thus far. Perhaps then, and only
then, will they recognize that deep seabed mining is not a contest
between the chimera of a New International Economic Order and
the ghosts of John Locke and Adam Smith, but a practical prob-
lem for which practical solutions are feasible.
tral Tribunal 1957) (states have a duty to seek agreement on "conflicting interests aroused
by the industrial use of international rivers.").
'16 See, e.g., Treaty Concerning Sovereignty and Maritime Boundaries, Dec. 18, 1978,
Australia-Papua New Guinea, art. 6, reprinted in VMI NE w DmECTIONS iN THE LAW OF THE
SEA 215, 227 (1980) (the parties agree to negotiate to achieve "equitable sharing of the bene-
fits" of mineral or natural gas deposits extending across the seabed jurisdictional lines de-
fined in the agreement).
11 U.N. CHARTER art. 33; see also Declarations on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter
of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/
8028 (1970) (adopted by consensus).
18 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Den.; Fed. Rep. Ger. v. Neth.),
1969 I.C.J. 4, 48 (Judgment of Feb. 20).
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